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Sexual harassment and sexual assault are ongoing problems in the
military. The Department of Defense responded in 2019 with sweeping
changes in how the military handles sexual misconduct, including a proposal
to criminalize sexual harassment in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). This Article, co-authored by an expert on workplace sex
discrimination and a former military officer, responds to this proposal. We
argue that sexual harassment, however reprehensible, is not criminal
conduct. Moreover, criminalization is likely to undermine the military’s
efforts to prevent and punish sexual harassment by raising the stakes for the
involved service members, thereby deterring reporting, and by imposing a
high evidentiary standard. Building on these insights, we propose a set of
reforms to the UCMJ aimed at aligning the military justice system with civil
employment discrimination law. These proposals include assigning
independent authority to investigate and discipline sexual harassment
outside the chain of command, using administrative actions that employ a
civil burden of proof to adjudicate sexual harassment complaints, and
making compensatory damages available to service members for economic
and psychological injuries caused by sexual harassment. The military
maintains that preserving good order and discipline justifies its
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independence from the reach of civil courts and law. Federal courts have
obliged by holding that Title VII does not cover uniformed military personnel.
In exchange for this independence, the military justice system must provide
the basic protections of the civilian justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, women have held formal positions in the military
only since World War II. 1 It has been a mere forty years since the last branch
of the military stopped using female-only units.2 Positions in ground combat
units officially opened to women just six years ago, in 2015.3 This
groundbreaking decision was the latest in a long line of developments
See JUDITH A. BELLAFAIRE, THE WOMEN’S ARMY CORPS: A COMMEMORATION OF WORLD
WAR II SERVICE 3–5 (1993) (stating that Congress introduced and passed the bill allowing
women to serve in the military in 1941).
2
BETTIE J. MORDEN, THE WOMEN’S ARMY CORPS, 1945–1978, at 395–96 (1990).
3
Andrew Swick & Emma Moore, The (Mostly) Good News on Women in Combat, CTR. FOR
NEW AM. SECURITY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-updateon-the-status-of-women-in-combat [https://perma.cc/J974-NV4L].
1
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diversifying the military, including racial integration beginning in 1948 4 and
the 2011 repeal of the policy barring openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual persons
from military service.5 Through all of these transitions and integrations,
4

See KRISTY N. KAMARCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44321, DIVERSITY, INCLUSION, AND
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMED SERVICES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
12–15 (2019) (documenting a history of racial segregation and discrimination in the United
States military and desegregation in the Truman era). Although racial minorities have
volunteered or been recruited into military service since the American Revolution, the
military was a racially segregated institution until the mid-twentieth century, justified by
widely accepted “separate but equal” ideology. Id. at 12. Responding to pressure by civil
rights leaders to integrate the military, in 1948, President Truman initiated a purposeful
desegregation effort with Executive Order 9981. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg.
4313 (July 28, 1948) (establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Forces).
5
See generally Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat.
3515 (providing for the repeal of the ban on gay men, lesbians, and bisexual people serving
openly in the military, to be effective sixty days after the President, Defense Secretary, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided certification that repeal “is consistent with
the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting
and retention.”). Until its repeal in September 2011, America’s “Policy Concerning
Homosexuality in the Armed Forces,” commonly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”
provided that:
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces . . .
if . . . the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . [,] stated that he or she
is a homosexual or bisexual . . .[,] [or] has married or attempted to marry
a person known to be of the same biological sex.
10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2008). After 2011, the policy change on LGBTQ service was swift and
consequential. On May 17, 2016, the Senate confirmed Eric Fanning as Secretary of the Army,
the first openly gay head of a service. Michael S. Schmidt & Charlie Savage, Eric Fanning
Confirmed as Secretary of the Army, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/05/18/us/eric-fanning-army-secretary.html [https://perma.cc/785Z-SSFQ]. In his role,
Fanning helped lift restrictions on transgender people serving in the military. Karen Ocamb,
Army’s Out Leader Eric Fanning Helps Guide End to Trans Military Ban, ADVOCATE (Nov.
1, 2016, 3:37 PM), https://www.advocate.com/transgender/2016/11/01/armys-out-leader-ericfanning-helps-guide-end-trans-military-ban [https://perma.cc/4AFY-GQUK]; see also U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., DTM 16-005, MILITARY SERVICE OF TRANSGENDER SERVICE MEMBERS,
ATTACHMENT 1 (June 30, 2016) [hereinafter DTM 16-005] (”Transgender Service members
will be subject to the same standards as any other Service member of the same gender . . . .”).
However, after his election, President Trump replaced Fanning and reinstituted the ban on
transgender individuals serving in the military, which the Supreme Court allowed to go into
effect without explanation. See Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2019) (“[T]he District
Court’s December 11, 2017 order granting a preliminary injunction is stayed . . . .”); Lolita C.
Baldor, Senate Confirms Former Ranger as New Army Secretary, AP NEWS (Sept. 27, 2019)
https:// apnews.com/article/0b4b666c180e491497ac93e52c44e367 [https://perma.cc/VT79ESTJ]. For a general discussion of the legality of the transgender ban and the long arc of
discrimination against LGBTQ people in the military, see Michele Goodwin & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Transgender Military Ban: Preservation of Discrimination Through
Transformation, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2019).
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sexual harassment and sexual assault have remained ongoing problems.
According to the Department of Defense, an estimated 20,500 service members
experienced unwanted sexual contact or a penetrative sexual assault in 2018.6
One in four female service members reported an experience of sexual
harassment.7 These figures represent a substantial increase from the previous
survey in 2016,8 and 2019 saw even further increases.9
In light of the #MeToo movement and recent attention it has brought
to the failure of institutions such as workplaces and universities to address
sexual harassment,10 it is worth examining the military’s record in this realm.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR
2018, at 3 (2019) [hereinafter DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT],
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/DoD_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_the_
Military.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RX8-QV65]. Of the 20,500 service members reporting that
they experienced unwanted sexual contact, 13,000, or 63%, were women, even though
women make up only 16% of active duty service members. Id.
7
Id. at 9.
8
Specifically, from 2016 to 2018, reports of unwanted sexual contact increased by 38% and
sexual harassment by 13%. Id. at 3, 12.
9
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL
YEAR 2019, at 6, 12 (2020) [hereinafter DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN
REPORT], https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/30/2002291660/-1/-1/1/1_DEPARTMENT_
OF_DEFENSE_FISCAL_YEAR_2019_ANNUAL_REPORT_ON_SEXUAL_ASSAULT
_IN_THE_MILITARY.PDF [https://perma.cc/B7VF-7VF3] (reporting a 3% increase in
sexual assaults involving service members and a 10% increase in formal sexual harassment
complaints from 2018 to 2019).
10
#MeToo is a social and political movement against sexual harassment and sexual abuse. The
phrase “Me Too” was coined, and the #MeToo movement founded, in 2007 by Tarana Burke,
a Black woman who had also founded Just Be Inc., a nonprofit organization that helps victims
of sexual assault and harassment. Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long
Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/metoo-movement-tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/Z89L-6CUL]. The #MeToo movement
spread virally in 2017 after actress Alyssa Milano posted a message on Twitter saying, “if
you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.” Id. The
tweet opened the floodgates to twelve million stories of sexual abuse, assault, and harassment on
Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat, and other social media platforms. Id. The movement led to highprofile firings, especially in Hollywood, as well as much criticism and backlash. Audrey Carlsen,
Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel & Zach Wichter, #MeToo
Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html
[https://perma.cc/W2LC-G7MV]. The movement also spurred an increase in sexual
harassment claims in the United States. See Andrew Murphy & Terran Chambers, Litigating
Harassment in the #MeToo Era, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2019, at 13 (“The attention to sexual
harassment coincided with a less publicized but steady uptick in the number of sexual harassment
allegations in the workplace . . . .”); U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Press Release, EEOC
Releases Preliminary FY 2018 Sexual Harassment Data, EEOC.GOV (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.
eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-preliminary-fy-2018-sexual-harassment-data [https://perma.
cc/YLC8-3H9F] (“[C]harges filed with the EEOC alleging sexual harassment increased by
more than 12 percent from fiscal year 2017.”).
6
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This issue is more urgent than ever, with more women serving in the military
than at any time in our country’s history. In 2017, women made up 16% of
the overall active duty force, compared with 9% in 1980 and just 1% in
1970.11 The historic transformation of the military in 2015 allowing women
to serve in combat positions12 officially opened about 220,000 military jobs
to women.13 Women can now “drive tanks, fire mortars and lead infantry
soldiers into combat. They [are] able to serve as Army Rangers and Green
Berets, Navy SEALs, Marine Corps infantry, Air Force parajumpers and
everything else that was previously open only to men.” 14 Yet, sexual
harassment negatively affects women’s entry into these elite combat units
and their performance within them. Moreover, the policy change admitting
women to one of the military’s last bastions 15 of male exclusivity and
supremacy has sparked debate and resistance from within the military,16
11

Amanda Barroso, The Changing Profile of the U.S. Military: Smaller in Size, More Diverse,
More Women in Leadership, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2019/09/10/the-changing-profile-of-the-u-s-military/ [https://perma.cc/R6NR-6VZU].
The percentage of officers who are women has also steadily grown since the 1970s; in 2017,
women represented 18% of commissioned officers, up from 5% in 1975. Id. See also OFF.
UNDER SEC’Y DEF. FOR PERSONNEL & READINESS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., POPULATION
REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES: FISCAL YEAR 2018 SUMMARY REPORT, at 37
& APP. D, tbl.D-19 [hereinafter DOD FY 2018 POPULATION REP.], https://www.cna.org/
research/pop-rep [https://perma.cc/85S3-TM4A] (choose “FY 2018 Executive Summary”)
(reporting the same numbers for 2018).
12
See Swick & Moore, supra note 3.
13
Matthew Rosenberg & Dave Philipps, All Combat Roles Now Open to Women, Defense
Secretary Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/politics/
combat-military-women-ash-carter.html [https://perma.cc/XD3P-RV83]. “Officially” is used
here, because, in fact, women have been placed into combat situations in Afghanistan and
Iraq since 2001. Id.
14
Id.
15
Of course, the ultimate last bastion of male exclusivity is male-only draft registration. See
50 U.S.C. § 3802(a) (“[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and
every other male person residing in the United States, who . . . is between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration.”).
16
The Marine Corps requested a waiver from the decision for certain front-line combat jobs—
which was denied—and statistics suggest that the Marine Corps has dragged its feet integrating
women into combat positions. Kate Germano, Opinion, Separate is Not Equal in the Marine
Corps, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/sunday-review/
marine-corps-women-segregation.html [https://perma.cc/ 9QXJ-UQBM]; Hope Hodge Seck,
Overruled on Women in Combat, Marine Corps Prepares to Integrate Units, MILITARY.COM
(Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/12/03/overruled-on-women-incombat-marine-corps-prepares-to-integrate.html [https://perma.cc/Z2UA-P45B] (“The U.S.
Marine Corps lost its bid to keep some combat fields closed to women . . . .”); Shawn Snow,
Where Are the Female Marines?, MARINE CORPS TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.marine
corpstimes.com/news/2018/03/05/where-are-the-female-marines/ [https://perma.cc/4WVFCWG4] (“The Marines were the only branch to ask for a waiver when the Pentagon ended
the policy that excluded women from combat jobs.”).
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Congress,17 and the general public, 18 exposing the negative attitudes about
women’s service that make addressing sexual assault and harassment so
difficult. For example, such hostility was on display in 2019, when it was
discovered that some 30,000 active duty and veteran Marines had used a
private Facebook group called “Marines United” to share thousands of nude
photographs of female service members. 19
In the past decade, the Department of Defense has worked to advance
a military culture free from sexual assault and harassment, making
considerable investments in policies and actions to prevent and respond to
sexual misconduct. 20 Among other actions, the Department of Defense has
increased its training, data collection, and reporting on sexual assault and
harassment in the military and has proposed adding sexual harassment as a
criminal offense in the military penal code. Yet, it seems these efforts have
not borne fruit; indeed, sadly, sexual assault and harassment in the military
grew markedly worse during the Trump administration.21
As we articulate in this Article, the military’s responses to the
#MeToo movement, although well-intentioned, are at once too punitive and
too meager. Making sexual harassment a crime could raise the stakes for the
involved service members (both the alleged perpetrator and victim) and
thereby deter reporting and resolution of incidents of sexual misconduct.
Criminalizing workplace sexual harassment, which is a serious yet distinct
phenomenon from rape and sexual assault, is also out of step with established
Supreme Court doctrine on sexual harassment in civilian workplaces, which
17

For example, the decision to allow women to serve in combat positions was immediately
blasted by Congressperson Duncan Hunter, R-Cal., a member of the House Armed Services
Committee, who alleged the policy change would erode the ability of the military to fight.
Tom Vanden Brook & Jim Michaels, Military Will Open All Combat Jobs to Women,
Defense Secretary Announces, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2015, 9:07 PM), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/nation/2015/12/03/women-in-combat-defense-secretary-ash-carter/
76719938/ [https://perma.cc/HJH6-TN7N].
18
The Center for Military Readiness, a nonprofit organization opposed to gender integration
of combat units and service by gay and transgender people, argues that integrating women
endangers male morale and military performance, leads to sexual assaults on female service
members, and decreases military effectiveness. Are Military Social Experiments Increasing
Sexual Assaults on Men and Women?, CTR. FOR MIL. READINESS (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://www.cmrlink.org/issues/full/are-military-social-experiments-increasing-sexualassaults-on-men-and-women [https://perma.cc/ER2K-YKEH].
19
See Paul Szoldra, An Internal Investigation Spurred by a Nude Photo Scandal Shows Just
How Deep Sexism Runs in the Marine Corps, TASK & PURPOSE (Dec 4, 2019, 4:27 PM),
https://taskandpurpose.com/marines-united-study [https://perma.cc/42TY-XNKS] (“[S]ome
30,000 active-duty Marines and veterans . . . shared thousands of nude photographs of female
Marines, and in some cases cyber-stalked them, revealing personal details and describing
where the women worked and lived on base.”).
20
See discussion infra Section II.B.
21
See sources cited supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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emphasizes prevention rather than punishment, however imperfect that
framework may be.22 Furthermore, criminalization is at odds with the latest
feminist thinking about the most effective responses to sexual violence and
harassment, which has centered around the idea that more collaborative, less
adversarial responses can more productively address the cultural and
systemic nature of sex discrimination within institutions.23
Yet, there is no question that sexual harassment in the military is a
serious, ongoing problem that requires a response. Training and data
22

This preventive approach, particularly the affirmative defense shielding employers from
liability for workplace sexual harassment, has been critiqued by employment discrimination
and critical legal scholars. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS,
CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 168–215 (2016) (discussing the origins of the
affirmative defense in sexual harassment cases and how courts, in applying the defense,
equate “symbolic structures” such as ineffective antiharassment policies with legal
compliance); Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 312–25 (2001) (discussing the mismatch between the
affirmative defense, which requires victims to report sexual harassment or risk losing their
claims, and the many rational reasons that victims do no report sexual harassment); L.
Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82
IND. L.J. 711, 733 (2007) (“[E]xpecting women to react to sexually harassing conduct in a
way that is different than the manner in which they have been socialized . . . punishes women
for acting in precisely the ways that they are generally expected to act.”); Tanya Katerí
Hernández, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment &
the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. R EV. 1235, 1244–45 (2006)
(discussing both that harassers disproportionately target women of color because of their
heightened vulnerability in the workplace and that women of color are less likely to report
sexual harassment than are white women); Laura T. Kessler, Employment Discrimination
and the Domino Effect, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1048 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has carved out a broad affirmative defense to employer liability for sexual harassment that,
in practical effect, requires victims of harassment to report in virtually all circumstances or
risk losing their claims.”).
23
See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED
POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 97 (2018) [hereinafter GOODMARK,
DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE] (“[T]he criminal legal system can deliver only
punishment, which does not provide some people with the reparation they seek . . . . Although
the United States has largely rejected the use of restorative justice . . . the rest of the world
has not been as hesitant.”); Julie Goldscheid, #MeToo, Sexual Harassment and
Accountability: Considering the Role of Restorative Approaches, 36 OHIO ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3645439 [https://perma.cc/J4QT-ETRA] (“The adversarial character of antidiscrimination law imposes high costs, both economic and psychological, on plaintiffs . . . .”);
see also Leigh Goodmark, Opinion, Stop Treating Domestic Violence Differently From
Other Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019) [hereinafter Goodmark, Stop Treating Domestic
Violence Differently], https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/opinion/domestic-violencecriminal-justice-reform-too.html [https://perma.cc/ 62ZH-VJ6D] (“The effectiveness of the
criminal legal response to domestic violence is a sensitive subject. Questioning it is a harder
sell politically than reconsidering our responses to drug or property crimes. But intimate
partner violence should be included in criminal justice reforms.”).
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collection without more fundamental institutional changes will fall short of
what is necessary to address the United States military’s serious sexual
misconduct problem, especially given the organization’s discriminatory
culture that devalues women.
This conflict between the clear need for a tougher response to sexual
harassment in the military and concerns about the potential harms of
criminalization poses a dilemma. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,24
the federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on sex and
sexual orientation, does not apply to uniformed members of the Armed
Forces.25 Rather, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is the federal
law that forms the foundation of the military justice system. 26 If sexual
harassment is to be addressed in the military justice system, it must be
through criminal law. The UCMJ is a criminal code of justice; there is no
civil legal system in the military. Some have argued for unification, whereby
Title VII would apply to military service members, but this is unrealistic. The
federal courts have long held that Title VII does not apply to the Armed
Forces, and Congress has not disrupted this interpretation of Title VII.
With these tensions and realities in mind, this Article explores a
middle ground: reforming the military justice system to better align with civil
employment discrimination law on sexual harassment. This approach raises
a range of complex legal problems, including the need to decide what body
of law, burden of proof, procedures, and remedies will control criminal sexual
harassment prosecutions in the military. While we cannot hope to present a
fully redesigned UCMJ in the scope of one Article, we begin here to sketch
the contours of a modernized UCMJ. The military justice system has already
undergone significant “civilianization” over time;27 it can and should be
pushed further to reflect civilian antidiscrimination norms.
Although our attention turns primarily to sexual harassment in this
Article, we also speak to the collective concerns about sex-based harms
generally, including rape and sexual assault. In doing so, we acknowledge
that there is a spectrum of sexual harms in the military and that a culture of
hostility toward women’s service forms the foundation for most sexual
harms. Importantly, we also acknowledge that sexual misconduct in the
military affects service members of all gender identities and sexual
orientations. Therefore, although we focus primarily on women, male service
members identifying as gay or bisexual and transgender service members
should benefit from the analysis and reforms presented in this Article, even
24

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 717(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(a).
See discussion infra notes 172–176 and accompanying text.
26
10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946.
27
See Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REV. 3 passim
(1970) (recounting the growth and development of the civilianization of military justice,
beginning in World War I).
25
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if their experiences of sexual violence may not be perfectly coextensive with
those of female service members.
Part I situates sexual harassment and assault in the military within the
military’s history and place in America, discussing the potential role of the
military to foster social integration and equality in American society.
Part II provides an overview of sexual misconduct in the military and
evaluates the military’s insufficient response. Specifically, Section II.A
examines statistics from the military’s latest internal surveys on sexual
harassment and assault, which demonstrate that the Department of Defense
is still struggling to reduce rates of sexual misconduct in the military. We also
discuss the persistence of a culture both inside and outside the military that
devalues female members’ service, particularly their participation in ground
combat units. Section II.B analyzes the military’s “CATCH” program, which
gives sexual assault victims the option of anonymously disclosing the
identifying information of alleged perpetrators to aid in the identification of
repeat offenders, as well as the DOD’s announced proposal to add a penal
article to the UCMJ directly criminalizing sexual harassment. Section II.C
details the inadequacies of these responses. Although CATCH and
criminalization may appear to be bold steps, our analysis demonstrates that
these initiatives fall short. At best, they mask deeper, structural problems in
the military justice system’s responses to sexual assault and harassment; at
worst, they undermine the DOD’s efforts in this area.
Finally, Part III turns to solutions. We outline an updated regulatory
framework for the UCMJ that that would bring the military’s legal response
to sexual harassment in closer alignment with civil employment
discrimination law. These proposals include assigning independent authority
to investigate and discipline sexual harassment outside the chain of
command, using administrative actions that employ a preponderance of the
evidence standard to adjudicate sexual harassment complaints, and making
compensatory damages available to victims for economic and psychological
injuries caused by sexual harassment. For the most part, all of these reforms
can be implemented within the parameters of the military justice system,
balancing the military’s desire to remain independent of civilian courts and
law with the rights of service members to be free of discrimination.
I. THE MILITARY, EQUALITY, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
As we argue in this Part, eliminating discrimination and sexual
misconduct in the military has broad implications for American society.
Participation in this central American institution is a marker of full
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citizenship.28 The military is also one of the United States’ largest and most
influential employers. In 2020, there were roughly 1.35 million men and
women serving on active duty. 29 Service members are tasked with cooperating
with one another, often over extended periods, and in diverse groups that at
least aspirationally place everyone on the same plane irrespective of racial,
ethnic, or sexual hierarchies. This aspiration, however incompletely realized,
makes the military an institution with significant potential to foster equality in
American society.30
The military has played a uniquely integrative function in our country.
At the same time, it has also served as a site of struggle over civil, women’s, and
LGBTQ rights and continues to reflect institutionalized inequalities. This
Section discusses this history, highlighting the military’s potential as an engine
of equality in American society, despite its historical and continuing challenges.
A. Civil Rights
The American civil rights movement arguably gained momentum
because of the American people’s close relationship with military service. 31
During World War II, America faced the racist ideology of the Nazis. This
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415 (1857) (“[W]hy are the African
race, born in the State, not permitted to share in one of the highest duties of the citizen? . . .
[H]e is not, by the institutions and laws of the State, numbered among its people . . . . [He]
is not therefore called on to uphold and defend it.”); Jane Dailey, The Sexual Politics of Race
in World War II America, in FOG OF WAR: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 145, 149 (Kevin M. Kruse & Stephen Tuck eds., 2012) [hereinafter FOG OF WAR]
(“The connection between bearing arms in defense of a community and being vested with full
rights within it . . . ha[s] been linked in America since the nation’s founding.”); see also
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the
Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1550 (2010) (“Dred Scott expressly equated
disarmament with enslavement and lack of citizenship.”).
29
DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH
REPORT (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp [https://perma.cc/
QW4S-8K34] (choose “October 2020” from “Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by
Rank/Grade (Updated Monthly)”). Including civilian military personnel, the Department of
Defense claims 3.2 million employees on its roster. Henry Taylor, Who is the World’s
Biggest Employer? The Answer Might Not Be What You Expect, WORLD ECON. F. (June 17,
2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/06/worlds-10-biggest-employers/?link=mktw
[https://perma.cc/35MP-C5G6].
30
See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and
the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2000) (“The idea of compelling people to get along may sound
paradoxical and potentially counterproductive. But the success of integration in the armed
forces—probably the most successful natural experiment in institutional integration that this
country has seen—suggests that people can in fact be ordered to get along.”).
31
See Robert P. Saldin, Strange Bedfellows: War and Minority Rights, 173 WORLD AFF. 57,
57 (2011) (“War, what is it good for? Well, minority rights for one thing . . . . Minority
groups that have contributed to war efforts have been rewarded with expanded rights.”).
28
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encounter exposed America’s own problem with racism, making segregation
at home increasingly untenable.32 In 1946, in response to an increase in racial
violence and tension across the United States, President Truman established
a Commission on Civil Rights. 33 Among other recommendations, the
Commission suggested desegregating the military. 34 The Commission’s final
report, entitled To Secure These Rights, highlighted the close relationship
between racial segregation in the military and unequal social conditions for
African Americans in American society, observing:
[A]ny discrimination which, while imposing an obligation,
prevents members of minority groups from rendering full
military service in defense of their country is for them a
peculiarly humiliating badge of inferiority. The nation also
suffers a loss of manpower and is unable to marshal maximum
strength at a moment when such strength is most needed.35
Noting that “[t]he war experience brought to our attention a laboratory in
which we may prove that the majority and minorities of our population can
train and work and fight side by side in cooperation and harmony,” the
Commission urged that “[w]e should not hesitate to take full advantage of
this opportunity.”36 President Truman did so by executive order, not believing
Congress would pass a bill to integrate the military. 37 Thus, the process of

Id. at 59 (“World War II . . . undermined racial supremacism in America . . . . [T]he US
had a weakness in that its denunciations of Hitler’s racist ideology were blatantly hypocritical
in the face of Jim Crow. This awkward fact led to increased attention on ‘the color line’ . . .
.”); see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 9 (2000) (“The purpose of the war would leave its victors with new
obligations. And if the war was, at least in part, a battle against racism, then racial segregation
and disenfranchisement seemed to belie the great sacrifices the war had wrought.”); Harvard
Sitkoff, African Americans, American Jews, and the Holocaust, in THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM: THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACIES 181, 181–96 (William Chafe ed.
2003) (reviewing how the horrors of the Holocaust and the United States’ involvement in
World War II proved central to the development of the civil rights movement).
33
Exec. Order No. 9808, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,153 (Dec. 7, 1946).
34
DUDZIAK, supra note 32, at 84–86; KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 14; see also Lisa Vox, How
Executive Order 9981 Desegregated the U.S. Military, THOUGHTCO. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://
www.thoughtco.com/executive-order-9981-us-military-desegregation-45360 [https://perma.cc/
765U-XZYJ].
35
PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIV. RTS., TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 8 (1947).
36
Id. at 47.
37
See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948): (“It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all
persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This
policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to
effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.”). The order also
32
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integrating the United States Armed Forces officially began in 1948. 38
Some military leaders 39 and rank-and-file service members resisted
the order, and de facto segregation persisted for some time.40 However,
political scientists and historians frequently cite African American service
during World War II as a chapter in our country’s history that significantly
shaped the civil rights movement.41 The military was one of the first testing
grounds and victories of the modern civil-rights era.42 According to historians,
in the decades after World War II, the United States military became one of the
most racially diverse institutions in the country, offering social mobility to
generations of Black Americans.
The potentially positive influence of the military on racial equality in
the United States continues to the present. For example, in 2003, the military
played a leading role in advocating for affirmative action in higher education.
In Grutter v. Bollinger,43 a Supreme Court case addressing the constitutionality
of race-conscious law school admissions at the University of Michigan,
several former top military officials filed an amicus brief arguing that “a
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to
command our nation’s racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the
military's ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national

established the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, tasked with studying the potential impact of integration on military
efficiency. See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 14.
38
Most of the actual enforcement of the order was accomplished by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s administration from 1953–1961, including the desegregation of military
schools, hospitals, and bases. The last of the all-Black units in the United States military was
abolished in September 1954. DAVID A. NICHOLS, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: EISENHOWER AND
THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 42–50 (2007).
39
See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 14 (“[S]ome military leaders [on Truman’s commission]
advocated for maintaining the status quo due to concerns about inefficiencies that might arise
from ‘impaired morale in mixed units.’”).
40
See DUDZIAK, supra note 32, at 87 (discussing resistance to racial integration well into the
1950s); Craig Westergard, Note, You Catch More Flies with Honey: Reevaluating the
Erroneous Premises of the Military Exception to Title VII, 20 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC.
WELFARE L. REV. 215, 219 (2019) (noting that Black service members were consistently
assigned to low skill jobs and had limited roles in the infantry until the 1960s); cf. Jason
Morgan Ward, “A War for States’ Rights”: The White Supremacist Vision of Double Victory,
in FOG OF WAR, supra note 28, at 126–44 (discussing racial violence in and around integrated
Southern military bases in the 1940s).
41
See, e.g., Saldin, supra note 31, at 66 (“African American service in World War II and
Korea helped shape the evolving civil rights movement.”).
42
See Kevin M. Kruse & Stephen Tuck, Introduction, in FOG OF WAR, supra note 28, at 4
(“African Americans demanded equal rights in return for their contribution to the defense
economy, their loyalty to the war effort, and their sacrifices as soldiers—and as mothers and
wives of soldiers.”).
43
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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security.”44 Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, embraced the
argument, noting that the “most selective institutions,” including military
academies and flagship state universities, are “training ground[s]” for leaders,
and, therefore, “must remain both diverse and selective.”45 The justices
repeatedly referenced the military brief during oral argument, 46 and the
Court’s majority opinion upholding the policy under the Fourteenth
Amendment contained more citations to the military brief than to any of the
more than one hundred other briefs submitted to the Court.47
This history of the military’s role in American race relations is an
admittedly complex story. We do not wish to paint an overly sanguine picture
of racial progress in the military or to downplay the military’s continuing
challenges in the realm of meaningful diversity. The racial integration of the
military was the culmination of a long period of Black protest, that is, of the
“long civil rights movement.”48 It did not spring into being overnight or
necessarily emerge from a widespread epiphany of race consciousness by
white people. Abundant exemplary scholarship also recounts the American
military’s central place in colonial conquest, 49 even as the military was
44

Consol. Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL
1787554, at *5.
45
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331, 332.
46
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–10, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241), 2003 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 26.
47
Jonathan Groner, In ‘Grutter v. Bollinger’ Amicus Avalanche, One Brief Stood Out, LEGAL
TIMES (July 2, 2003, 12:00 AM) http://www.law.com/almID/900005535864/ [https://perma.
cc/893L-QGPA].
48
See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the
Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1235 (2005) (telling a “truer” story of the “long civil rights
movement” that “took root in the liberal and radical milieu of the late 1930s, was intimately
tied to the ‘rise and fall of the New Deal Order,’ accelerated during World War II, stretched
far beyond the South, was continuously and ferociously contested, and, in the 1960s and
1970s, inspired a ‘movement of movements’ that ‘def[ies] any narrative of collapse.”).
49
See, e.g., ODD ARNE WESTAD, THE GLOBAL COLD WAR: THIRD WORLD INTERVENTIONS
AND THE MAKING OF OUR TIMES 396 (2007) (“[T]he Cold War was a continuation of
colonialism through slightly different means.”); Bruce Cumings, The Wicked Witch of the
West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East, in THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ITS
MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS 90 (Michael J. Hogan ed., 1992) (“[W]hat the Cold War was
really about for Americans [was] interventions in the Third World, from Korea through Iran,
Guatemala and Cuba, to the debacle in Vietnam."); Penny Von Eschen, Civil Rights and
World War II in a Global Frame: Shape-Shifting Racial Formations and the U.S. Encounter
with European and Japanese Colonialism, in FOG OF WAR, supra note 28, at 182 (“[T]he
term ‘cold war’ [is] a misnomer for the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the
Middle East, where democratic challenges often met with violent suppression by either
[U.S.] proxies or covert operatives, or both.”). There are numerous works examining the
military’s role in American colonial history in specific contexts. See, e.g., KEVIN K. GAINES,
AMERICAN AFRICANS IN GHANA: BLACK EXPATRIATES AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2006);
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promoting racial equality in its ranks at home. 50 Finally, we would be remiss
not to acknowledge the Department of Defense’s recent involvement in the
militarization of the police and the dispersal of the Black Lives Matter protests. 51
As these examples demonstrate, there is no straight line from racial integration
to antiracism; rather, more often than not, organizational reform has yielded new
forms of racism and racial thinking. Nevertheless, we think the history
summarized here demonstrates that the military, as an institution with a central
role in defining American citizenship, has the potential to promote broader
equality in American society. As such, it is an institution that should be of special
concern when thinking through societal responses to sexual harassment.
B. Women’s Rights
As with racial integration, the history of women in the military
suggests a connection between women’s integration in the military and
gender equity in the civilian sector.
While women fought in our nation’s conflicts from the very
beginning,52 they were not given formal roles in the Armed Forces until
World War II.53 Women participated in some branches of the military as early
as the turn of the twentieth century, serving primarily as nurses and in clerical
occupations.54 Traditional, sexist attitudes excluded them from other
occupations.55 This pattern of exclusion changed substantially during World
War II, when many military occupations opened to women, including “airplane
mechanics, air traffic controllers, instructors and other specializations with the

DOUGLAS LITTLE, AMERICAN ORIENTALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST
SINCE 1945 (3d ed. 2008); MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS: 1945–1990 (1991).
50
See DUDZIAK, supra note 32, at 12–14 (discussing the connections between domestic civil
rights reform and America’s military activities promoting democracy around the world
during the Cold War).
51
See, e.g., Paul D. Shinkman, Trump Tests the U.S. Commitment to an Apolitical Military,
U.S. NEWS (June 8, 2020, 6:53 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/
2020-06-08/trump-tests-the-us-commitment-to-an-apolitical-military [https://perma.cc/9TYKUKXH] (discussing President Trump’s threat to deploy the U.S. military against Black Lives
Matter protesters).
52
See Linda Grant De Pauw, Women in Combat: The Revolutionary War Experience, 7 ARMED
FORCES & SOC’Y 209, 210 (1981) (noting that an estimated 20,000 women served in the
Colonial Army in the Revolutionary war, with several hundred serving as uniformed
combatants); Kaia Danyluk, Women’s Service with the Revolutionary Army, COLONIAL
WILLIAMSBURG INTERPRETER, Fall 1997, at 8–13, https://cwfpublications.omeka.net/
items/show/84 [https://perma.cc/SYU5-E4ZB] (describing the role of female “camp followers”
in the Colonial Army).
53
See BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 3–5.
54
See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 23.
55
Id.
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exception of direct combat roles,” and a small group of women even served as
pilots in a special sex-segregated unit of the Air Force.56
After observing the contribution of female civilian contract workers
in the First World War, Congresswoman Edith Rogers of Massachusetts
introduced a bill in 1941 to establish a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps
(WAAC).57 Army Leadership did not want women to be fully integrated into
the Regular Army. Therefore, as a compromise, the WAAC was established
as a separate entity designed to work “with” the Army rather than as a part of
it.58 Support for the bill came in large part as a result of the attack on Pearl
Harbor and the prospect of a war on two fronts. 59 Military generals feared
there would be manpower shortages.60 Rather than spend time training men,
they decided it would be more efficient to place already highly-skilled
women in essential service jobs like switchboard operations and typing.61
Congress approved the bill on May 14, 1941, and it was signed into law by
President Roosevelt.62
Resistance to the integration of women into the Armed Forces
emerged from the beginning. In 1943, the wartime Office of Censorship, an
agency charged with reviewing soldiers’ mail, noted that 84% of letters
mentioning the WAAC were unfavorable.63 Male soldiers tended to question
the morals of women in military service, and “male folklore” held that
WAACs were prostitutes assigned to “keep men happy.”64 Negative
perceptions of women in military service spilled into the civilian sphere,
making WAAC recruitment more difficult.65 Anti-WAAC perceptions derived
from the commonly held view that women should not serve in traditionally
male organizations. Moreover, male soldiers’ families were not anxious for
their sons, husbands, and brothers to be “freed” from more comfortable
military jobs for combat.66
Women in the WAAC were not treated as equal members of the
Armed Forces, even though they were permitted to serve overseas. Because
they were not part of the Regular Army, they were ineligible for retirement
56

Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
58
BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 3–4.
59
See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 23.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 5.
63
Id. at 16.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., id. at 4–5 (noting statements of a congressman opposing the WAAC, who asked:
“Who will then do the cooking, the washing, the mending, the humble homey tasks to which
every woman has devoted herself; who will nurture the children?”); id. at 16–17 (discussing
resentment of soldiers’ and their families toward the WAACs).
57
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or veterans’ benefits. 67 They served mostly under temporary arrangements
and under restrictive policies;68 in essence, they were an auxiliary resource. 69
Following World War II, Congress finally ended women’s exclusion
from formal military service with the passage of the Women’s Armed
Services Integration Act of 1948, 70 giving them a permanent place in the
military. The Act, however, also imposed quotas limiting the proportion of
women to 2% of the enlisted force and 10% of officers 71 and instituted
unequal treatment for women in other respects. 72
Some branches of the military were quicker than others in disbanding
their female-only components. For example, the Navy disbanded its femaleonly reserve branch or the “WAVES” (Women Accepted for Volunteer
Emergency Service) in 1948.73 In contrast, the Army maintained the femaleonly Women’s Army Corps (WAC) (the Regular Army successor to the

67

See KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 23; see also BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining
that WAACs were not provided with overseas pay, life insurance, medical coverage, or death
benefits granted to Regular Army soldiers, and that female WAACs officers officially
received less pay than male officers of similar rank).
68
ELLEN C. COLLIER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IB79045, WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES CRS-2
(1982).
69
In 1943, due to the success of the WAAC, the Army asked Congress for authorization to
integrate the WAAC as a component of the Regular Army. With this integration, women
would serve as actual, if segregated, members of the Armed Forces in the Women’s Army Corps
(WAC). Creation of the Women’s Army Corps, ARMY.MIL: WOMEN IN THE ARMY,
https://www.army.mil/ women/history/wac.html [https://perma.cc/A8TE-BENX] (last visited
Dec. 10, 2020). As such, one may argue that the WAC was the precursor to Congress’s
largescale integration of women in 1948.
70
Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356; see also MORDEN, supra note 2, at 48.
71
KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 24. The officer quota excluded nurses. Id. at 24 n.122.
72
Specifically:
[W]omen required parental consent for enlistment under the age of 21 (the
age of consent was 18 for men); women could not hold a permanent rank
above lieutenant colonel/commander . . . [and] male spouses had to
demonstrate dependency in order to receive female servicemembers’
dependent’s benefits and/or the female servicemember had to be the family’s
primary source of support for her children to be considered dependents.
Id. at 24. Around this time, the military also developed guidelines for investigating
homosexuality among women soldiers and stepped up investigations of alleged lesbians. See
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 180–84 (2009). Canaday argues that the lesbian witch hunts were closely
related to generalized anxieties about gender in the military following women’s permanent
integration; that is, the military engaged in widespread investigations of alleged female
homosexuality to “police[] . . . women in the service as a class.” Id. at 213.
73
Naval Hist. & Heritage Command Commc’n & Outreach Div., The First Waves, THE
SEXTANT (July 29, 2016), https://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/2016/07/29/the-firstwaves/ [https://perma.cc/LZJ9-Q2FZ].

Vol. 6:3]

Sexual Harassment is Not a Crime

429

WAAC)74 until 1978.75 By this time, maintaining a segregated, female-only
branch of the Army was widely viewed as discriminatory, even by the
Department of Defense, which drafted the legislation abolishing the WAC.76
Once assimilated into the Armed Forces, the military still prohibited
women from serving in combat arms units. 77 Such units included Infantry,
Special Forces, Armor, and Artillery. These units have the primary function
of engaging enemy forces in direct combat. Under the combat exclusion
policy, women were limited to occupations like Transportation, Ordnance,
Quartermaster, Military Intelligence, or Military Police, whose purpose is to
provide ancillary or supporting services. The combat exclusion policy had
existed since women started service in World War II, primarily due to
conceptions deeming it inappropriate for women to engage in combat. 78
Despite resistance to women’s full integration into the Armed Forces,
women’s involvement in World War II presented a far-reaching challenge to
systemic sex discrimination in American society. Integration allowed women
to prove their abilities so that civilian employers were “hard-pressed to deny
jobs to women solely because of sex.”79
As labor historians have documented, women’s involvement in the
wartime labor force during World War II also contributed to their economic
gains and integration into traditionally male-dominated workplaces and
occupations.80 When men went off to war by the millions, women stepped
into the civilian and war economy jobs that men left behind, taking their place
on assembly lines and in defense plants for aircraft manufacturers,
74

On July 1, 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Public Law 78-110, which converted the
auxiliary WAAC to the WAC, making it a part of the Regular Army and giving full benefits
to women. See Creation of the Women’s Army Corps, supra note 69; Act of July 1, 1943, ch.
187, Pub. L. No. 78-110, 57 Stat. 371.
75
MORDEN, supra note 2, at 395–97.
76
Id. at 395–96 (reporting broad acceptance of the legislation abolishing the WAC by the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, active and retired WACS, and Congress, and
that one Senator stated, in support, “‘Imagine . . . a separate personnel system for Blacks or
Catholics or Chicanos. The country would not stand for such a thing.’”).
77
Id. at 128; Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356.
78
See BELLAFAIRE, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the suitability of women for noncombatant jobs).
79
ROBERT L. GOLDICH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NO. 80-27F, WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES:
PROCEEDINGS OF A CRS SEMINAR HELD ON NOVEMBER 2, 1979 AND SELECTED READINGS
(1980). This is not to diminish the fact that even formal sex discrimination in the workplace
continued into the 1970s. See KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON TRIAL: GENDER AND RIGHTS
IN THE MODERN AMERICAN WORKPLACE 110 (2016) (discussing ongoing union campaigns
to address pay equity, sexual harassment, job training, childcare, and job safety in the 1970s);
id. at 126 (“In the late 1970s, nearly half of working women were in occupations that were
at least 75 percent female . . . .”).
80
See generally KAREN ANDERSON, WARTIME WOMEN: SEX ROLES, FAMILY RELATIONS, AND
THE STATUS OF WOMEN DURING WORLD WAR II (1981) (exploring the impacts of World War II
on the occupational distribution of women and their long-term economic advancement).
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automakers, shipbuilders, and steelmakers, for example. 81 They were pressed
into service as taxi drivers, shuttling injured sailors from Navy ships to
hospitals in cities like Seattle. 82 Women of all walks of life joined the civilian
workforce in blue and white collar jobs, ranging from streetcar operators,
construction workers, and agricultural workers to government and office
workers.83 All in all, an estimated six million women joined the civilian
workforce during World War II. 84
Ultimately, the war did not fundamentally transform women’s status in
American society.85 Women’s workplace presence was met with resistance by
employers and unions.86 After the war, both private and public employers pushed
women out of the workplace87 and back into the home.88 Moreover, because
81

Id. at 6.
Susan Paynter, As WWII Raged, Seattle’s First Female Cab Drivers Made History, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER (March 15, 2011, 4:15 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/AsWWII-raged-Seattle-s-first-female-cab-drivers-1144290.php [https://perma.cc/8CCT-ZF8D].
83
Annette McDermott, How World War II Empowered Women, HIST. (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.
history.com/news/how-world-war-ii-empowered-women [https://perma.cc/K7N4-4MCL].
84
Id. In addition, educational institutions admitted women into traditionally male fields of science,
medicine, and technology. Locally, women also served on juries for the first time in several states,
replaced male political party workers, and won election to state offices. See SUSAN M. HARTMANN,
THE HOME FRONT AND BEYOND: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 1940s, at 210 (1982).
85
See ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 173 (“Despite the temporary gains of the war years,
women’s status within the labor force was not much better than it had been before the war.”).
86
See id. at 23–31, 35, 44–47, 52–61, 64–65 (documenting how in Seattle, Detroit, and
Baltimore, for example, employers and unions only reluctantly opened their doors to women,
especially in previously male-dominated workplaces and occupations). Even worse, Black
women continued to be objects of discrimination based on race as well as gender. Id. at 36–42.
87
See id. at 161, 164–69 (discussing reconversion layoffs of women after the war); RUTH
MILKMAN, ON GENDER, LABOR, AND INEQUALITY 119–38 (2016) (discussing the
“defeminization of basic industry” at the end of World War II, using the auto industry as a
case study); Sheila Tobias & Lisa Anderson, What Really Happened to Rosie the Riveter?
Demobilization and the Female Labor Force, 1944-47, in WOMEN’S AMERICA: REFOCUSING
THE PAST 354, 354–73 (Linda K. Kerber & Jane De Hart Matthews eds., 1982) (discussing
private and public discrimination against women workers in the reconversion period and
suggesting that the war’s liberative potential was thwarted by postwar politics). For
discussions of the post-war “purges” of women by unions, see Nancy Gabin, Women
Workers and the UAW in the Post-World War II Period: 1945–1954, 21 LAB. HIST. 5 (1979)
and Lyn Goldfarb, Separated & Unequal: Discrimination Against Women Workers After
World War II (The U.A.W. 1944-54) (Women’s Work Project, A Union for Radical Political
Economics, n.d.) (unpublished pamphlet, on file with Healy Library Archives and Special
Collections, Univ. Mass., Boston). These works, and others, refute the “turning point”
theory, which attributes women’s economic gains and increased labor force participation in
the post-war period to their involvement in the wartime economy. Other scholars, however,
defend the theory’s salience. See ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 8–10 (discussing
disagreements among historians and economists over the turning point theory).
88
ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 175–78; ELAINE TYLER M AY, HOMEWARD BOUND:
AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA 62–70 (1988). Institutions of higher education
82
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military service determined eligibility for valuable governmental benefits, it
helped define deserving (mostly male) and undeserving (mostly female)
beneficiaries in the post-war welfare state.89 Yet, however temporary, wartime
opportunities in the civilian labor force contributed to the breakdown of social
structures relegating women to the home and set the stage for more fundamental
social changes in gender roles and legal developments in the 1960s.90
With the women’s rights movement and the shift to an all-volunteer
force in 1973, women’s integration into the military rapidly accelerated,
facilitated by Supreme Court decisions,91 federal legislation,92 and policy

reverted to preferring men after the war, with male veterans receiving preference in college
admissions; women were increasingly present on campuses as wives of male college students
and departmental clerical workers. See HARTMANN, supra note 84, at 106–07; cf. MAY,
supra, at 78 (discussing college as a route to marriage for middle-class white women in the
post-war years; many women dropped out of college upon marrying).
89
See Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane?: Citizenship, Gender, and Social
Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 94 (2002) (“[T]he GI Bill, like the
Social Security programs, was instrumental in shaping the postwar economy and society by
reinforcing traditional gender norms in its distribution of benefits.”). This dynamic played
out inside the military as well. See JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, THE RISE OF THE MILITARY
WELFARE STATE 117–31 (2015) (tracing the demise of robust military social welfare benefits
to the influx of women, minorities, and poorer service members in the early years of the allvolunteer military; conservative critics, echoing attacks on welfare recipients, painted the
new soldiers as a class of freeloaders).
90
See ANDERSON, supra note 80, at 174 (“The influx of large numbers of married women
into the labor force marked an important turning point for women, involving as it did the
implicit rejection of the idea that a woman’s household responsibilities could not be
reconciled with outside employment.”); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY:
WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 17
(2001) (“In this period of rapid and dramatic change in women’s workforce roles, older
notions of protection for women workers began to crumble and occupational segregation by
sex became the target of attack.”); see also McDermott, supra note 83 (“[A]fter their selfless
efforts during World War II, men could no longer claim superiority over women. Women had
enjoyed and even thrived on a taste of financial and personal freedom—and many wanted more.
Though progress was slow over the next two decades, serving their country in the military and at
home empowered women to fight for the right to work in nontraditional jobs for equal pay and
for equal rights in the workplace and beyond.”). Kessler-Harris also argues that women’s
experience in World War II had long-lasting impacts on notions of gender within the
women’s rights movement, as “a new consensus emerge[d] among women leaders” that
women should “drop claims to gender difference.” KESSLER-HARRIS, supra, at 17.
91
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973) (holding that the policy
requiring female service members to prove the dependency of their spouses was
unconstitutional, thus entitling female service members to the same dependent benefits as
male service members for their spouses and children).
92
See, e.g., Act of May 24, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-290, 88 Stat. 173 (codified as amended at
10 U.S.C. § 505) (reducing the minimum age of consent for women to enlist to be consistent with
the age of consent for men); Act of Oct. 7, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, § 803(a-c), 89 Stat. 537
(current version at 10 U.S.C. § 7442) (allowing women to attend the military service academies).
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directives from the Department of Defense and the services.93 In the 1990s,
Congress banned the use of gender quotas for any military occupation, although
women’s exclusion from most combat occupations continued.94
In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin lifted the combat exclusion
policy on nearly all aviation roles, which allowed women to serve as attack
aviation pilots for the first time. 95 However, the prohibition of women in
ground combat roles remained in place. It was not until 2013 that Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta announced plans to rescind the combat exclusion
policy; he directed all branches of the Armed Forces to conduct assessments
on how to integrate women into all career fields by 2015.96 In 2015, Secretary
of Defense Ash Carter formally announced that all military occupations
would be opened to women.97
In an influential essay published in 1978, Harvard sociologist Maury
Feld predicted that the inclusion of significant numbers of women in the
military would inevitably increase women’s social, political, and economic
equality in American society. 98 Ending the masculine monopoly on statesponsored violence, he argued, would have a radical impact on conventional
perceptions of women within the social system, disrupting the “cultural
complex” which makes women appear to be “a natural object of men’s own
aggressive impulses.”99 The military’s ongoing problems with sexual
harassment and sexual violence suggest that Feld underestimated the
resilience of sexism. Women’s integration has not necessarily undermined
For example, in 1972, the DOD opened the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) to
women, and in 1975, it repealed a policy permitting involuntary separation of pregnant
women from the military. KAMARCK, supra note 4, at 26.
94
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
§543(2), 107 Stat. 1547, 1660–61 (1993) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 113 note).
95
See Swick & Moore, supra note 3; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
96
See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Leon Panetta and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Martin Dempsey to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts on Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground
Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 24, 2013), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/WISRJointMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCR8-8P5Z] (recognizing the contributions
of the women currently serving in the military and affirming that the goal of the Department
is to remove all gender based, non-performance related barriers to career advancement for
women in service).
97
See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Ash Carter to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts on
Implementation Guidance for the Full Integration of Women in the Armed Forces (Dec. 3,
2015) [hereinafter DOD 2015 Order to Fully Integrate Women], https://dod.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD014303-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7WP-Q5UJ] (formally
announcing that there are no exceptions to the 1994 recission of the Combat Exclusion Rule).
98
See M.D. Feld, Arms and the Woman: Some General Considerations, 4 ARMED FORCES &
SOC’Y 557, 558 (1978).
99
Id.
93
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the gendered structure of the military or American society.100 Yet, taken as a
whole, the history recounted here demonstrates that women’s integration has
played a role in challenging societal systems of sex discrimination. While we
do not contend that women’s participation in the American military pushed
American society inexorably toward women’s equality, it has contributed to
the reformulation of gender roles.
C. Voting Rights
Young adults ages eighteen to twenty-one enjoy the right to vote as a
direct consequence of military service. 101 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution was enacted in 1971 during the Vietnam War, lowering the
national minimum voting age from twenty-one to eighteen.102 This change
was a response to the perceived unfairness of sending young draftees to
combat without a say in the political process, as reflected in the “old enough
to fight, old enough to vote” slogan touted by proponents of lowering the
voting age.103 After Congress passed the Amendment, thirty-eight states
100

See discussion infra Section II.A; cf. also Noya Rimalt, Women in the Sphere of
Masculinity: The Double-Edged Sword of Women’s Integration in the Military, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1097, 1113–17 (2007) (examining the resilience of sexist ideology and
practices in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) despite decades of women’s integration,
including a gendered division of labor and sexual harassment in the IDF).
101
See generally Hilary Parkinson, Records of Rights Vote: “Old Enough to Fight, Old
Enough to Vote”, NAT’L ARCHIVES: PIECES OF HISTORY (Nov. 13, 2013) https://prologue.
blogs.archives.gov/2013/11/13/records-of-rights-vote-old-enough-to-fight-old-enough-tovote/ [https://perma.cc/N8VT-LYYL].
102
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
103
The “old enough to fight, old enough to vote” slogan actually first emerged during World
War II, when President Roosevelt lowered the minimum age of draftees to eighteen, causing
debate over sending young men off to war without the right to vote. Parkinson, supra note
101. In his 1954 State of the Union Address, President Eisenhower said: “For years our
citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 have, in time of peril, been summoned to fight for
America. They should participate in the political process that produces this fateful
summons.” Annual Message to Congress on the States of the Union, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 6,
22 (Jan. 7, 1954). Debate intensified during Vietnam due to growing public dissatisfaction
over the apparent inequities of the draft, particularly the use of educational deferments that
resulted in the disproportionate drafting of young, low-income men. See David Card &
Thomas Lemieux, Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The Unintended Legacy of the
Vietnam War, 91 AMER. ECON. REV. 97, 97–98 (2001) (detailing how deferments for college
influenced many young single men to remain in school). In 1970, Congress amended the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to allow eighteen-year-olds to vote in state and national elections.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 52 U.S.C.). Although President Nixon signed
the amendments into law, he did so stating that he believed Congress did not have the
authority to change the age requirement for state elections. Statement on Signing the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 512, 512–13 (June 22, 1970). The
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ratified it in only 100 days, the fastest time for any constitutional
amendment.104
D. LGBTQ Rights
Scholars have detailed the historical exclusion of gay men and lesbians
from the United States military and the links between changing understandings
of sexuality in the military and in American society.105 A detailed account of
this history is beyond the scope of this Article. However, we briefly summarize
the latest chapter in this history to highlight the military’s potentially positive
role in fostering equality in American society, however complex and
ambiguous the narrative of progress.
In 2010 President Obama signed the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal
Act into law, ending the Department of Defense policy that had banned
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals from serving in the military. 106
This policy change was instituted five years before the Supreme Court held
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry. 107 Justice
Supreme Court considered the issue in Oregon v. Mitchell and held that Congress only had
authority to lower the voting age in federal elections, but not state elections, producing a
result where voters under the age of twenty-one would be able to vote for the President and
congressional representation, but not state or local officials. 400 U.S. 112, 150 (1970). This
impractical situation resulted in Congress unanimously passing the 26th Amendment in
1971, with the requisite thirty-eight states ratifying the amendment in only 100 days.
Parkinson, supra note 101.
104
See Proclamation 8691, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,215 (July 8, 2011) (detailing the Presidential
proclamation by President Obama acknowledging the 40th anniversary of the 26th Amendment).
105
See CANADAY, supra note 72, at 55–90.
106
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 654). There were policies prohibiting gay individuals from serving in the
Armed Forces since WWII, but the branches did not adopt a unified approach. See NAT’L
DEF. RSCH. INST., RAND CORP., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
POLICY: AN UPDATE OF RAND’S 1993 STUDY 41 (2010) (describing inconsistencies among
the approaches taken by each service). This led to a 1982 Department of Defense Directive
providing a unified rationale for prohibiting gay and lesbian individuals from serving,
allegedly because of “military effectiveness.” See id. at 41 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR.
1332.14 (1982); DIR. 1332.30 (1986)). In 1993, President Clinton was poised to eliminate
the ban entirely via executive order but faced strong opposition from the military and
Congress, the latter threatening to add the ban to the Family and Medical Leave Act. See id.
at 42 (citing a statement by then Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole). A compromise position
was reached that came to be known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” whereby gay Americans
could serve so long as they remained closeted; the military would remove questions about
sexual orientation on induction forms and service members would be required to keep
information about a same-sex orientation private. See id. at 43; see also DAVID F. BURRELLI,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., NO. 7-5700, “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”: MILITARY POLICY AND THE
LAW ON SAME-SEX BEHAVIOR 1–4 (Dec. 16, 2010) (detailing the history of the Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell policy).
107
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).
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Kennedy, writing for a five-member majority of the Court, explained that the
repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell “led to an enhanced understanding” of the
constitutional definition of marriage. 108
Presidential administrations often use the military as a canvas on
which to project policies they think should represent American values.
This understanding of the military’s powerful example no doubt motivated
the Obama administration to allow open military service by gay,
lesbian,109 and transgender110 individuals during his administration;
President Trump’s reversal (on transgender service);111 and President
108

Id. at 676.
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 654); see also DTM 16-005, supra note 5 (describing “strength through
diversity” as a motivation for allowing transgender people to serve in the military).
110
In June 2016, during the Obama administration, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
announced a new policy that would allow transgender service members to openly serve in
the military. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TRANSGENDER SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY, AN
IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 2 (2016).
111
In July 2017, President Trump announced on Twitter that the military would not allow
transgender individuals to serve in any capacity. Factbox: Trump on Twitter (July 26) - U.S.
Military, Transgender Individuals, REUTERS (July 26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-tweet-factbox/factbox-trump-on-twitter-u-s-military-transgender-indi
viduals-idUSKBN1AB1X9 [https://perma.cc/7A92-ZQMJ] (providing transcripts of
Trump’s tweets announcing the transgender service ban). President Trump followed through
with his tweets by issuing a presidential memorandum in August 2017 that blocked
transgender persons from serving and allowed for their discharge. See Memorandum on
Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 587 (Aug. 25,
2017) (highlighting the politically divisive issue of the “use of the Departments’ resources
to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures,” and prohibiting transgender individuals from
serving in the military). Legal challenges in federal district court resulted in preliminary
injunctions temporarily halting the Trump policy. See Karnoski v. Trump, Case No. C171297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 747, 769 (D. Md. 2017); Stockman v. Trump, Case No. EDCV 17-1799 JGB, 2017
WL9732572, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 217
(D.D.C. 2017). However, after Trump’s 2017 Memorandum was enjoined, President Trump
revoked the 2017 Memorandum and replaced it with a new memorandum banning most
transgender persons from service but adding a grandfathering provision and new, narrower
exceptions. See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. to President Trump, subject: Military
Service by Transgender Individuals (Feb. 22, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/
Mar/23/2001894037/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-SERVICE-BY-TRANSGENDER-INDIVIDUALS.
PDF [https://perma.cc/9YCM-5ZZ8] (adding exceptions); Memorandum on Military Service
by Transgender Individuals, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Mar. 23, 2018) (revoking and
replacing the 2017 Memorandum). The Trump Administration then moved to dissolve the
preliminary injunctions, claiming there had been a significant change to the policy. See
Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13,
2018); Stone v. Trump, No. GLR-17-2459, 2019 WL 5697228, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2019);
Stockman v. Trump, 331 F. Supp. 3d 990, 993 (C.D. Cal. 2018); Doe 2 v. Trump, 315 F.
Supp. 3d 474, 483 (D.D.C. 2018). Several district courts decided it was really the same policy
109
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Biden’s decision to reinstate the Obama policy in full immediately upon
taking office.112
In sum, as we have demonstrated, societies shape their military
institutions in their own image, but military institutions also help shape
society113—for better or worse.114 In the age of the #MeToo movement and
increased focus on sexual assault and harassment, it is therefore worthwhile
to consider how a massive organization like the Department of Defense has
addressed these problems. A critical examination of the military’s record on
sexual misconduct is necessary for the health of the military and our country
more broadly.
II. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT IN THE MILITARY
A. Two Decades of Data on Sexual Assault and Harassment in the Military
Perhaps it should not be surprising, in light of the military’s
complicated relationship with integration and equality, that it continues to
struggle with sexual assault and harassment. As we discuss in this Part, the
and found the preliminary injunctions were still warranted, but the U.S. Supreme Court
stayed the injunctions by a 5–4 vote. Trump v. Karnoski, 139 S. Ct. 950, 950 (2019).
Additionally, the D.C. and Ninth Circuits both reversed decisions that held the preliminary
injunctions in place, with the D.C. Circuit vacating the preliminary injunction and the Ninth
Circuit remanding for further consideration. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 22
(D.C. Cir. 2019); Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1207 (9th Cir. 2019). The transgender
ban went into effect in April 2019 while the legal challenges continued into discovery. See
GLAD Legal Advocs. & Defs. & Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rts., Timeline, NO TRANS MILITARY
BAN, https://notransmilitaryban.org/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/5C6U-2RPE] (last visited
June 20, 2020).
112
President Biden reversed Trump’s policy just five days after taking office with the
Executive Order on Enabling All Qualified Americans to Serve Their Country in Uniform.
See Exec. Order No. 14,004, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,471 (Jan. 25, 2021) (revoking President Trump’s
2018 Memorandum and directing the Department of Defense “to ensure that all transgender
individuals who wish to serve in the United States military and can meet the appropriate
standards shall be able to do so openly and free from discrimination”). The Department of
Defense issued policy updates permitting openly transgender individuals to serve in the
military on March 31, 2021. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Press Release, DOD Announces Policy
Updates for Transgender Military Service, DOD.GOV (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.defense.
gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2557220/dod-announces-policy-updates-for-trans
gender-military-service/ [https://perma.cc/WJJ8-W44U].
113
See generally MAURY D. FELD, THE STRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE: ARMED FORCES AS
SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1977).
114
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). In 1942, President
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, “giving the army the power, without warrants or
indictments or hearings, to arrest every Japanese-American on the West Coast—110,000
men, women, and children—to take them from their homes, transport them to camps far into
the interior, and keep them there under prison conditions.” HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 416 (2005).
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Department of Defense has in recent decades made considerable investments
in policies and actions that aim to prevent and respond to sexual misconduct.
These efforts have been spurred by heightened awareness about sexual
harassment in the United States since the 1990s 115 and several high-profile
sexual misconduct scandals that brought public attention to the military’s
deeply sexist culture. However, despite more than two decades of reform
efforts by the military to address the problems of sexual assault and
harassment, little has changed.
Concerted efforts to address sexual misconduct in the military began
in the early 1990s with the “Tailhook” and “Aberdeen” sexual misconduct
scandals.116 In the Tailhook scandal, United States Navy and Marine Corps
aviation officers sexually assaulted eighty-three women and seven men
during a 1991 annual convention of the Tailhook Association, 117 a fraternal
organization of naval aviators.118 In the fallout from the scandal, the Secretary

115

One might argue that ground zero for this emerging awareness in the United States was
Professor Anita Hill’s allegation that Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually
harassed her from 1981 to 1983 when he was her supervisor at the EEOC, and her riveting
testimony in his confirmation hearings before the United States Senate in October 1991. See
4 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 41–48 (1991)
(statement of Anita Hill, Professor, University of Oklahoma); ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH
TO POWER (1997); Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings
and Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 662 & nn.1–2 (2006) (discussing the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings). Although Thomas adamantly denied the allegations and the
Senate confirmed him, a nationwide debate ensued about sexual harassment, how to define
it, prevent it, and limit employer liability. Less than one year after Justice Thomas’s
confirmation hearings, reports of sexual harassment to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission rose by more than 50%. Jane Gross, Suffering in Silence No More: Fighting
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/13/us/
suffering-in-silence-no-more-fighting-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/8SZY-TR7T].
116
See Michael Winerip, Revisiting the Military’s Tailhook Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/booming/revisiting-the-militarys-tailhook-scandalvideo.html [https://perma.cc/9TPR-JY9B]; see also Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the
End for Women in the Military, 48 FLA. L. REV. 461, 464 (1996) (discussing the Aberdeen
sexual misconduct scandal).
117
See Winerip, supra note 116.
118
Specifically, the Tailhook Association is a U.S.-based, nonprofit fraternal organization of
naval aviators. See TAILHOOK, https://www.tailhook.net/ [https://perma.cc/YRX2-3D6W]
(last visited Nov. 28, 2020). The word “tailhook” refers to a device underneath the rear of
certain military aircraft that catches an arresting wire suspended across an aircraft carrier’s
flight deck to rapidly decelerate the landing plane. See Tom Harris, How Aircraft Carriers
Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (Aug. 29, 2002), https://science.howstuffworks.com/aircraftcarrier4. htm [https://perma.cc/7XQW-KPUH].
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of the Navy resigned after Congress learned that he had visited a hotel room
near the hall where the assaults took place.119
The Aberdeen scandal involved sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving
Ground in 1996.120 Aberdeen was home to the Army Ordnance Corps Advanced
Individual Training (AIT) school, an entry training program for new recruits.121
The Army began investigating allegations of assault in 1996, with the
investigation ultimately resulting in fifty formal complaints of sexual harassment
and abuse.122 Eleven drill sergeants and one officer were implicated for abusing
positions of power by forcing trainees to have sex with them. One sergeant had
raped nineteen trainees, and an officer had slept with a trainee who had come to
him for advice about how to deal with sexual harassment from a drill
instructor.123 Ultimately, four officers were sentenced to prison while eight
others were discharged or received nonjudicial punishments; Aberdeen’s
commanding general and three other officers received reprimand letters.124 As a
result of the incident, the DOD directed all branches of the military to assess their
training policies and formed a Federal Advisory Committee on Gender
Integration Training, which issued recommendations in 1997.125
The Department of Defense first began collecting data on sexual
assault and harassment around this time via the Workplace and Gender

119

See Eric Schmitt, Navy Chief Quits Amid Questions Over Role in Sex-Assault Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/27/us/navy-chief-quitsamid-questions-over-role-in-sex-assault-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/8ZMZ-46XH].
120
See Neil A. Lewis, Ex-Sergeant Pleads Guilty to Having Sex with Trainees, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 8, 1997) https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/08/us/ex-sergeant-pleads-guilty-to-hav ingsex-with-trainees.html [https://perma.cc/8NLS-6HCV].
121
History, U.S. ARMY ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, https://home.army.mil/apg/index.php/
about/history [https://perma.cc/V6W3-52QY] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020).
122
Id.
123
Id.; see also United States v. Simpson, 55 M.J. 674, 692, 698–707, 710 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
2001) (reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence and affirming Army drill sergeant Delman
Simpson’s conviction of eighteen rape charges, noting that “the record clearly reflects that
the appellant was a sexual predator”).
124
See Steve Vogel, Scandal-Scarred Army Busts Drill Sergeant in Sex-Crime Clampdown,
L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000may-14-mn-29893-story.html [https://perma.cc/E5NW-UD2M].
125
See NANCY L. KASSELBAUM & WILLIAM S. COHEN, FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON GENDERINTEGRATED TRAINING & RELATED ISSUES, DOD-5188, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON GENDER-INTEGRATED TRAINING AND RELATED ISSUES TO THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE 3–4 (1997), https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/LPS79701 [https://perma.cc/NNG9ADA9] (presenting a set of recommendations to improve gender integrated training,
including better screening of recruits, increasing the number of female recruiters and trainers,
establishing separate barracks for men and women, enforcing consistent standards for male and
female recruits, improving instruction on how men and women should relate to one another
professionally, and improving “values” training).

Vol. 6:3]

Sexual Harassment is Not a Crime

439

Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA).126 The first survey was
administered in 1988, and a subsequent survey was conducted in 1995
following the Tailhook scandal. Since 2002, Congress has mandated surveys
on racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination, 127 as well as an annual report to
Congress on the “status of female members of the armed forces” addressing
promotion and retention rates, selection for elite service schools, assignment
to male-dominated occupational fields, and incidence of sexual harassment
complaints made during that fiscal year. 128 These surveys and reports have
generated significant data on gender discrimination and the prevalence of
sexual assault and harassment.
Overall, the picture that emerges from this data is a general lack of
progress with regard to sexual assault and harassment in the military. That is,
despite two decades of data collection and concerted efforts to address the
problems of sexual assault and harassment in the military, these efforts have
not been successful. Data from the six WGRA surveys between 2002 and
2018 show that 22% to 34% of women and 3% to 6% of men experienced
sexual harassment.129 In the same period, the prevalence rate of sexual assault
126

See Valerie A. Stander & Cynthia J. Thomsen, Sexual Harassment and Assault in the U.S.
Military: A Review of Policy and Research Trends, 1 MIL. MED. 20, 21 (2016) (explaining
the history of the WGRA survey and the instruments it uses).
127
Section 561 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 requires the Secretary of
Defense to carry out one of four quadrennial surveys (each in a separate year) “to identify
and assess racial and ethnic issues and discrimination, and to identify and assess gender
issues and discrimination, among members of the armed forces.” See Pub. L. No. 107-314,
116 Stat. 2458, 2553 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 481).
128
Id.
129
See RACHEL N. LIPARI & ANITA R. LANCASTER, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., ARMED FORCES 2002 SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 16 fig. 3.3 (2003) [hereinafter
2002 WGRA SURVEY], https://archive.defense.gov/news/Feb2004/d20040227shs1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66YH-YL9Q] (reporting that 24% of active duty females and 3% of active
duty males reported experiencing sexual harassment in 2002); RACHEL N. LIPARI, PAUL J.
COOK, LINDSAY M. ROCK & KENNETH MATOS, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., 2006 GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS 4 (2008),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Personnel_Related/2
006-WGRA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB6T-B4X7] (reporting that 34% of women and 6% of
men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2006); LINDSAY M. ROCK, RACHEL N. LIPARI,
PAUL J. COOK & ANDREW D. HALE, DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2010
WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS: OVERVIEW REPORT
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT iv (2011) [hereinafter 2010 WGRA SURVEY], https://apps.dtic.mil/
sti/pdfs/ADA541045.pdf [https://perma.cc/P39X-UQTR] (reporting that 21% of women and 3%
of men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2010); DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., 2012 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY
MEMBERS: SURVEY NOTE AND BRIEFING 4 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 WGRA SURVEY],
https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/defense-research [https://perma.cc/RX2UUW4B] (choose “2012 WGRA Survey Note” from “Active Duty”) (reporting that 23% of women
and 4% of men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2012); LISA DAVIS, AMANDA
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ranged from 4% to 7% for women and 1% to 2% for men.130 And the problem
is actually getting worse.
According to the Department of Defense 2018 Annual Report on
Sexual Assault in the Military, 20,500 service members reported that they had
experienced “unwanted sexual contact” during the 2018 fiscal year, 131 an
increase of roughly 38% over the 2016 survey. 132 Of the 20,500 service
members reporting that they experienced unwanted sexual contact, 13,000 or
63% were women,133 even though women make up only 16% of active duty
service members.134 Young women between the ages of 17 and 24 and junior
enlisted women were at greatest risk of being assaulted, with nearly 10% of
junior enlisted women indicating that they experienced a sexual assault. 135
In fiscal year 2018, one in four female service members reported
experiencing sexual harassment.136 This figure is consistent with prior studies
of sexual harassment in the military going back almost two decades. For
example, in 2014, at Congress’s request, the RAND National Defense
Research Institute conducted an independent assessment of sexual harassment.
Roughly 560,0000 active duty and reserve service members were surveyed.137
GRIFKA, KRISTIN WILLIAMS & MARGARET COFFEY, OFF. OF PEOPLE ANALYTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., 2016 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS:
OVERVIEW REPORT xvi (2017) [hereinafter 2016 WGRA SURVEY], https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/
dwp/app/dod-data-reports/defense-research [https://perma.cc/RX2U-UW4B] (choose “2016
WGRA Overview Report” from “Active Duty”) (reporting that 21.4% of women and 5.7% of men
indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2016); RACHEL A. BRESLIN, LISA DAVIS, KIMBERLY
HYLTON, ARIEL HILL, WILLIAM KLAUBERG, MARK PETUSKY & ASHLEA KLAHR, OFF. OF PEOPLE
ANALYTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2018 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE
DUTY MEMBERS: OVERVIEW REPORT ix (2019) [hereinafter 2018 WGRA SURVEY],
https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-data-reports/defense-research [https://perma.cc/RX2UUW4B] (choose “2018 WGRA Overview Report” from “Active Duty”) (reporting that 21.4%
of women and 5.7% of men indicated experiencing sexual harassment in 2018) (reporting that
24.2% of active duty women and 6.3% of active duty men indicated experiencing sexual
harassment in 2018).
130
See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 (reporting
sexual assault and prevalence rates from 2006 to 2018); see also Stander & Thomsen, supra note
126, at 21 (discussing sexual assault and prevalence rates from 2002 to 2012).
131
DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
132
Id. at 3, 12; see also Dave Philipps, ‘This is Unacceptable.’ Military Reports a Surge of Sexual
Assaults in the Ranks, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/us/
military-sexual-assault.html [https://perma.cc/63BR-3X3Y].
133
DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
134
Barroso, supra note 11.
135
See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT , M AIN REPORT , supra note 6, at 10
(“An estimated 9.1 percent of junior enlisted women (E1-E4) indicated experiencing
sexual assault . . . .”).
136
Id. at 9.
137
RAND CORP., SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY:
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 2014 RAND MILITARY WORKPLACE STUDY 1 (2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9841.html [https://perma.cc/2EZB-PQ43].
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The results showed that 22% of women and 7% of men experienced sexual
harassment.138 Of those who experienced harassment, just 33% of men and
46% of women reported it.139 The RAND study also found that sexual
harassment and gender discrimination are highly correlated with sexual
assault.140 Prior to the 2014 RAND survey, the 2002 WGRA survey found
that 24% of women in the military and 3% of men had been sexually
harassed.141 In other words, there has been little progress in the overall rates
of sexual harassment in the military in nearly twenty years. Based on these
figures, comparative studies suggest that sexual harassment is substantially
worse in the military than in civilian workplaces. 142
The 2016 WGRA included questions addressing sexual orientation
and transgender identity for the first time. Overall, 22.8% of service members
identifying as LGBT experienced sexual harassment and 4.5% sexual assault,
compared with 6.2% and .8% for those who do not identify as LGBT,
respectively.143
Military service members who experience sexual assault and
harassment often never see a remedy. Military surveys indicate that there is
insufficient accountability. 144 Sexual assault is underreported, meaning that
138

Id. at 3.
RAND CORP., 2 SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY:
ESTIMATES FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SERVICE MEMBERS FROM THE 2014 RAND MILITARY
WORKPLACE STUDY 50 (Andrew R. Morral, Kristie L. Gore & Terry L. Schell eds., 2015), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR870z2-1.html [https://perma.cc/48BW-KQNA].
140
Id. at xxii, 92–93; see also TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL ASSAULT ACCOUNTABILITY &
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT ACCOUNTABILITY AND INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE REPORT 18 (2019) [hereinafter SAAITF REPORT], https://media.
defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127159/-1/-1/1/SAAITF_REPORT.PDF [https://perma.cc/
9FZB-QT9C] (“Based on surveys conducted by the Department, there is a strong positive
correlation between the occurrence of sexual harassment within military units and the
occurrence of sexual assault.”).
141
2002 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at 18.
142
See Remus Ilies, Nancy Hauserman, Susan Schwochau & John Stibal, Reported Incidence
Rates of Work-Related Sexual Harassment in the United States: Using Meta-Analysis to
Explain Reported Rate Disparities, 56 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 607, 624 (2003) (finding, based
on a meta-analysis, that the prevalence of sexual harassment is significantly higher in the
military than in three different civilian contexts (academic, private sector, and government)).
143
See 2016 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at xxii.
144
The most recent evidence of this is the military’s own investigative report of sexual
harassment and ultimate murder of Vanessa Guillén, a 20-year-old U.S. Army soldier, inside a
Fort Hood, Texas, armory by another enlisted soldier in April 2020. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY,
REPORT OF THE FORT HOOD INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE 17, 18, 21, 27 (2020), https://
www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/forthoodreview/2020-12-03_FHIRC_report_redacted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U96L-FMGH] (detailing the utter failure of the Army’s sexual assault and
harassment response and prevention program at Fort Hood, including “hollow” and
“perfunctory” responses to reports of sexual assault and harassment, higher than average rates
of violent sex crimes, NCO’s (responsible for reporting) themselves taking advantage of
subordinate victims, and “universal” fear of retaliation for reporting sexual misconduct).
139
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only a fraction of victims report sexual assault to military authorities. In 2018,
only one in three service members who experienced a sexual assault reported
it to a military authority.145 In FY 2018, just 7% (223 out of 3,005) of sexual
assault cases in the Defense Department’s jurisdiction investigated with a
reportable outcome led to a sex offense conviction. 146
Military surveys indicate that most respondents—67%—who
experienced unwanted sexual contact and reported it to a military authority
faced retaliation for reporting.147 A 2015 investigation by Human Rights
Watch similarly found a widespread culture of retaliation against service
members who report sexual assault in the military. They suffered a host of
negative consequences, including adverse changes in work assignments,
negative performance evaluations, punishment for minor infractions,
bullying, and threats.148 Negative consequences for reporting sexual
harassment are similarly routine. Actions taken in response to those who
report sexual harassment and gender discrimination are “frequently negative;
for example: being encouraged to drop the issue, discouraged from filing a
report, or being treated worse, avoided, or blamed by coworkers.”149

145

See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 15
(stating that 30% of the estimated 20,500 total service members who experienced a sexual
assault in fiscal year 2018 made a report).
146
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL
YEAR 2019, APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL DATA ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 32–42 (2020)
[hereinafter DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, APP. B], https://www.sapr.mil/
sites/default/files/3_Appendix_B_Statistical_Data_on_Sexual_Assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A2R9-RQWA]. For a study examining the causes of the low conviction rate for sex crimes
in the military, see Carolyn M. Warner & Mia A. Armstrong, The Role of Military Law and
Systemic Issues in the Military’s Handling of Sexual Assault Cases, 54 L. & SOC’Y REV. 265
(2020) (finding, on the basis of an analysis of 585 sex-assault report summaries, that the
military’s low conviction rate for sexual assault is attributable to a number of systemic
factors, including “rape culture,” which leads to skepticism about victims’ claims; lack of
jurisdiction; the high evidentiary standards required for court-martial; the availability of
alternative non-criminal dispositions in the military justice system; typical prosecutorial
concerns about quality of evidence; and military-specific concerns prioritizing mission
readiness and a defendant’s otherwise “good military character” over prosecution).
147
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR
2018, APPENDIX C: METRICS AND NON-METRICS ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 18 (2019),
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/sapro/Reports/04%20-%20FY%2018%20Appendix%20C%20
Metrics%20and%20Non-Metrics%20on%20Sexual%20Assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S7VR6NR] (reporting that 67% of those who reported a sexual assault said they perceived at
least one negative outcome connected with reporting, including professional reprisal,
ostracism, and maltreatment.).
148
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, EMBATTLED: RETALIATION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT
SURVIVORS IN THE US MILITARY (May 18, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/18/
embattled/retaliation-against-sexual-assault-survivors-us-military [https://perma.cc/EG4N-CLP3].
149
See 2018 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at x–xi.
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Sexual misconduct is also an issue at the three military Service
Academies (West Point, Air Force Academy, Naval Academy). The Service
Academies are military colleges that produce officers and future leaders for
each branch of the Armed Forces. 150 The Department of Defense Annual
Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Service Academies,
Academic Program Year 2017–2018 found a 50% increase in sexual assaults
over the 2015–2016 school year, with 747 students reporting unwanted
sexual contact during the year. 151 Fifty percent of women and 16% of men
experienced sexual harassment. 152 These findings are especially troubling
because the Academies are considered prestigious institutions, cultivating the
military’s future leaders. Women are relatively well represented at the
Academies; about a third of all students are female.153 If the institutions
creating the future leaders of our Armed Forces are still struggling with sexual
assault and harassment, it is a discouraging sign for the military writ large.
B. The DOD’s Response
Responding to the worsening statistics on sexual misconduct from the
2018 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, then-Acting Secretary
of Defense Patrick Shanahan issued a memorandum to the top leadership of
the Armed Forces titled “Actions to Address and Prevent Sexual Assault in
the Military.”154 His message was urgent:
We must address how we are structured and how we resource
efforts to combat this scourge. We must improve our culture
to treat each other with dignity and respect and hold ourselves,
and each other, more accountable. The essential elements that
give rise to dignity and respect must be part of our daily
repertoire of interactions. This is a call to action. 155

U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AT THE
MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES: ACADEMIC PROGRAM YEAR 2017–2018, at 27 (2019)
[hereinafter DOD 2018 SERVICE ACADEMY REPORT], https://evawintl.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/APY17-18_MSA_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ62-VWP4].
151
Id. at 6; Patricia Kime, Sexual Assaults Rise Nearly 50 Percent at Service Academies,
MILITARY.COM (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/01/31/sexualassaults-rise-nearly-50-percent-service-academies.html [https://perma.cc/U2HV-ZBG7].
152
DOD 2018 SERVICE ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 150, at 4, 6.
153
Id. at 6.
154
Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. to Sec’ys of Mil. Dep’ts, et al., subject: Actions to
Address and Prevent Sexual Assault in the Military (May 1, 2019) [hereinafter Shanahan
Memorandum], https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002126804/-1/-1/1/ACTIONS-TOADDRESS-AND-PREVENT-SEXUAL-ASSAULT-IN-THE-MILITARY.PDF
[https://perma.cc/4HST-6HS2].
155
Id. at 1.
150
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The memorandum called for sweeping changes to how the military handles
sexual assaults and included six directives. 156
The first and arguably most significant directive was to adopt the
DOD Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task Force’s
(SAAITF) recommendation that the Joint Service Committee on Military
Justice (JSC)157 should draft a proposal for a specific offense of sexual
harassment to be added to the Manual for Courts-Martial.158 This new article
would make sexual harassment a criminal offense under military law, with
its own distinct elements. 159 The second directive was to develop “climate
assessment tools” designed to allow leaders to identify and address problems
in their units.160 The third directive was to launch a “Serial Offender
(CATCH) Program,” a program designed to identify repeat offenders.161 The
fourth directive was to develop measures to improve assessment of military
recruit character; this was, essentially, a directive to screen out individuals
with a history or propensity for sexual misconduct in the military’s recruiting
process.162 The fifth directive called for the creation of a working group on
training junior officers to address sexual harassment and sexual assault. 163
Finally, Shanahan directed the military to implement the 2019–2023 DOD
Sexual Assault Prevention Plan of Action (PPOA).164 The PPOA is a strategic
plan to “guide the Department’s prevention efforts at each echelon of the
military environment.”165 Among other features, the Plan includes measures

156

Id. at 1–3; see also Tom Vanden Brook, Shanahan Calls for Reforms as Military Sexual
Assaults Rise by 38%; Highest for Young Women, USA TODAY (May 2, 2019, 12:15 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/05/02/military-sexual-assaults-climb-20162018-pentagon-army-navy-marines-alcohol/3625405002/ [https://perma.cc/F8Z9-5Z9T].
157
The JSC is charged with keeping the Manual for Courts-Martial and Uniform Code of
Military Justice current. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 5500.17, ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 1 (Feb. 21,
2018) (defining the roles, responsibilities, and procedures of the JSC in reviewing and
proposing changes to the MCM); see also JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., https://jsc.
defense.gov [https://perma.cc/8H73-HSMM] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020) (describing the role
and jurisdiction of the JSC).
158
See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 1; see also SAAITF REPORT, supra note
140, at 19.
159
Id.; see also infra Section II.B.2.b.
160
See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 2.
161
Id.; see also infra Section II.B.1.
162
See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 2.
163
Id. at 2–3.
164
Id. at 3.
165
United States Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response:
Prevention, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.sapr.mil/prevention [https://perma.cc/5ZLS65V4] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020).
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to survey the magnitude of sexual misconduct in the military, identify risk
factors, implement prevention activities, and continue evaluation.166
Although Shanahan’s memo was no doubt part of a genuine effort to
address sexual assault and harassment, most of the recommendations are not
departures from what the military already does on a consistent basis. The
Department of Defense already collects data on sexual misconduct and has a
firm understanding of the scope of the problem. 167 Reassessment of sexual
assault and harassment prevention trainings is nothing new. However, two of
the suggested measures represent substantive departures from past military
policy and deserve attention. These are implementing the CATCH repeat
offender program and making sexual harassment a punitive offense under the
UCMJ.
1. The CATCH program
The Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program, recently
implemented in 2019, is a DOD-wide program designed to track individuals
who are reported as “perpetrators” in “restricted” (i.e., anonymous, informal)
reports of sexual misconduct. The CATCH program works a bit like a sexoffender registry. An individual submits the name or other identifying
information of an alleged perpetrator to an online repository, which military
criminal investigators use to check against other restricted reports to see if
there is a match.168 If there is a match, CATCH program representatives will
contact the victim and let them know. 169 With this knowledge, the victim has
one of two options. They can take formal action against the alleged
perpetrator by filing an “unrestricted” report disclosing the victim’s and
alleged perpetrator’s identities and involving the respective chains of
command. In the alternative, they can choose to do nothing, in which case
they will be contacted again if the alleged perpetrator’s name comes up in
another report within ten years. 170 If that notification is subsequently made, a
OFF. OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR PERSONNEL & READINESS, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
PREVENTION PLAN OF ACTION 2019–2023, at 5–7 (2019), https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/
files/PPoA%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EJ7-TZHG].
167
See discussion supra Section II.A.
168
C. Todd Lopez, New DOD Program Leaves Sexual Predators Nowhere to Hide,
DEFENSE.GOV (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1926005/
new-dod-program-leaves-sexual-predators-nowhere-to-hide/ [https://perma.cc/3AYK-XY7Y].
169
Id.
170
Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT
PREVENTION & RESPONSE [hereinafter DOD CATCH Program], https://www.sapr.mil/catch
[https://perma.cc/FJT6-VFCU] (last visited Nov. 28, 2020). For a victim information flyer
summarizing the program, see SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE OFFICE, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., CATCH A SERIAL OFFENDER (CATCH) PROGRAM VICTIM INFO SHEET,
166
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CATCH Program representative or a sexual assault response coordinator
contacts the victim to let them know. Victims can then use the new
information to decide whether they want to convert their restricted report to
an “unrestricted” report, which will allow a criminal investigation into the
assault allegations to go forward. 171
2. Criminalizing sexual harassment
A second significant recommendation made by Secretary of Defense
Shanahan in his memo to the Armed Forces was that a punitive article directly
criminalizing sexual harassment should be added to the UCMJ.172 To
understand the significance of this recommendation, one must first
understand that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to
uniformed members of the Armed Forces. Congress extended Title VII
protections to federal employees, including “personnel actions affecting
employees or applicants for employment . . . in military departments” in
1972.173 However, civilian case law has firmly established that the term
“military” in this sentence only refers to civilian employees working for the
military branches; Title VII does not protect uniformed military personnel.174
This interpretation is based both on courts’ statutory construction of Title

https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/public/images/icons/SAPRO_Catch_A_Serial_Offe
nder_Program_%28CATCH%29_Slick_Sheet_Rd06.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD8R-BVBX]
[hereinafter CATCH VICTIM INFO SHEET].
171
See Lopez, supra note 168 (illustrating a victim’s options in the CATCH program with a
flow chart).
172
See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 1.
173
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103, 111
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16).
174
See, e.g., Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Overton v. N.Y. State
Div. of Mil. & Naval Affs., 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. United States, 227 F.3d
295, 299 (5th Cir. 2000); Coffman v. Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1997); Corey v.
United States, No. 96-6409, 1997 WL 474521, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 1997); Randall v.
United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1996); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537, 1541
(11th Cir. 1987); Roper v. Dep’t of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987); Salazar v.
Heckler, 787 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1986); Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928–
29 (9th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied
review of the issue. See Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub
nom. Jackson v. Braithwaite, No. 20-19, 2020 WL 6829074 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2020); Stinson
v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 959 (1988); Johnson v.
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S 986 (1978). For critiques of this
doctrine, see Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for
Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082 (1987); Westergard, supra note 40.
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VII175 and the policy justification that extending Title VII to uniformed
service members would interfere with military leaders’ ability to maintain
good order and discipline within their units.176
There is also an almost complete bar on service members’ ability to
bring tort or other claims for damages against the United States government
for injuries related to military service. This principle is known as the Feres
doctrine, established in a 1950 Supreme Court case Feres v. United States.177
The doctrine first barred claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act 178 but
federal courts subsequently extended it to preclude damage actions for
violations of service members’ constitutional rights.179 Like the categorical
exclusion of employment discrimination in the military from judicial review
under Title VII, the Feres doctrine rests on the notion that allowing suits for
damages for injuries sustained in military service would degrade the
military’s ability to maintain order and discipline. 180 Indeed courts have
Specifically, courts have reasoned that the terms “Armed Forces” and “Military
Departments” are defined individually and differently in the definitions section of Title 10
of the U.S. Code, outlining the role of the Armed Forces, and that Congress referenced Title
10 (at least indirectly) in the Title VII provision delineating employees subject to Title VII’s
coverage. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 928 (explaining that the different definitions for
“armed forces” and “military departments” indicate that Congress intended there to be a
distinction between the two terms, “the former consisting of civilian employees the latter of
uniformed military personnel”).
176
See Westergard, supra note 40, at 227–28.
177
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
178
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680. The FTCA allows specific types of lawsuits against
the federal government and federal employees who have acted within the scope of
employment while causing injuries.
179
See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983) (barring claims for constitutional
torts for uniformed service members). In Chappell, five sailors alleged that seven of their
superior officers had discriminated against them because of their race. Id. at 297.
180
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (“Feres seems best explained by the
‘peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects the
maintenance of such suits on discipline . . . .’’’). The Court also reasoned that existing
statutory disability and death benefits for members of the military “compare extremely
favorably” with those provided by workers’ compensation statutes, justifying displacement
of tort damages. Feres, 340 U.S. at 159. The Supreme Court has subsequently upheld Feres
in a number of contexts. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 (unanimously holding that no cause
of action exists under the Constitution for tort suits by service members against other service
members); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (expanding the Feres doctrine
to encompass a tort claim arising from the murder of an off-duty service member off-base
by another service member, even though the situation did not meet the traditional “incident
to service” test); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987) (holding that the Feres
doctrine barred a tort suit by members of the Coast Guard injured in a helicopter crash during
a rescue mission although the tortfeasor, an FAA air traffic controller, was not a member of
the military). But see Brown, 348 U.S. at 113 (holding that Feres does not bar claims of
veterans after they have left military service). Feres has been subjected to sustained criticism.
175
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cross-referenced these exceptions and, in doing so, broadly protected the
military from the reach of civil law.181
In sum, the legal claims civilian employees commonly use to address
sexual harassment in the workplace are largely unavailable to uniformed
service members. What is left is largely a matter of disciplining the
perpetrator rather than compensating the victim.182 Because of the
unavailability of civil remedies for sexual harassment in the military
workplace, when military leaders, the Department of Defense, and Congress
have sought to demonstrate a level of seriousness about sexual misconduct in
the military, the tendency has been to lean toward more serious criminal
punishments like courts-martial.183 To understand why adding a punitive
article for sexual harassment to the UCMJ is a significant—and potentially
problematic—recommendation, a brief explanation of military law is required.
a. The military justice system
The military justice system is separate from the civilian legal system.
It derives its authority from the UCMJ, a statute enacted by Congress.184
See Westergard, supra note 40, at 245 (documenting historical trends that contradict the
policy considerations behind the Feres doctrine); see also discussion Section III.C. infra.
181
See, e.g., Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223–24 (8th Cir. 1978) (reasoning that the
Feres doctrine’s concern about military discipline justifies barring Title VII claims in the military).
182
See Westergard, supra note 40, at 231 (arguing that because neither the UCMJ nor
Department of Defense Equal Opportunity (EO) Program provides damages to service
members who suffer discrimination, there is little incentive for service members to report
given the risk of retaliation).
183
See Greg Rustico, Note, Overcoming Overcorrection: Towards Holistic Military Sexual
Assault Reform, 102 VA. L. REV. 2027, 2050–51 (2016) (citing various statements of highranking officials, including President Obama, pushing for court-martial convictions for
sexual assault).
184
The Uniform Code of Military Justice is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946. The United
States Constitution authorizes Congress to create a system of military justice. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress authority to raise and support armies, provide and
maintain a navy, and providing for organizing, disciplining and regulating them); see also
Dana Michael Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One: Four Proposals to Combat Sexual
Harassment in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 176 (2007) (discussing the
historical justification for the maintenance of a separate legal system for military personnel);
1 DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-6,
Lexis (database updated Sept. 2020) (providing a history of the U.S. military justice system).
Traditionally, military commanders had inherent authority to discipline or punish their
troops, and this has been incorporated into the UCMJ with respect to nonjudicial punishment.
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, at I-1 (2019 ed.)
[hereinafter MCM], https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%
20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610 [https://perma.cc/T22E-F9RZ] (“Military law
consists of the statutes governing the military establishment and regulations issued
thereunder, the constitutional powers of the President and regulations issued thereunder, and
the inherent authority of military commanders.”).

Vol. 6:3]

Sexual Harassment is Not a Crime

449

Military courts interpret and enforce it.185 The original American Code of
Military Justice predates the U.S. Constitution.186 The UCMJ took on its current
form after World War II, a conflict in which roughly two million service
members were court-martialed.187 As Commander in Chief, the President
implements the UCMJ by executive order in a document called The Manual for
Courts-Martial.188 It contains the Rules for Courts-Martial, Military Rules of
Evidence, Punitive Articles, and Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures.189
The UCMJ is unique because it serves not only as a system of justice
to address offenses, but as a tool for military commanders to maintain order
and discipline within a unit. As such, unit commanders have broad
responsibility and discretion for deciding whether or not to discipline or
charge soldiers in their units. Consequently, unit commanders play a critical
role in military law. These are primarily company level officers, who are
junior officers with roughly five to ten years of service. 190 Depending on the
branch of service and occupation, a company commander could be

See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2165, 2170 (2018) (“In the exercise of its authority
over the armed forces, Congress has long provided for specialized military courts to
adjudicate charges against service members.”).
186
See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 939 (2015)
(“In 1775, the Second Continental Congress codified the first American Articles of War,
which, among other things, provided for courts-martial for certain prescribed offenses. The
1775 Articles were reaffirmed (as amended) in 1776 and 1786.”).
187
See SCHLUETER, supra note 184, § 1-6(E). Prior to and during World War II, each branch
of the military had its own code of justice. Under the leadership of Professor Edmund M.
Morgan, Jr., Congress enacted a uniform code with the Military Justice Act of 1950. Id.
There have been updates to the UCMJ over the years, with the latest significant updates
occurring in 2016 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.
See Military Justice Act of 2016: Overview, OFF. OF THE JUDGE ADVOC. GEN., (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2019/01/10/ [https://perma.cc/R2GW-AYSX] (summarizing major 2016 changes to the military justice code).
188
Exec. Order No. 13825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 1, 2018).
189
MCM, supra note 184, at i–xlii. The Rules for Courts-Martial are analogous to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Military Rules of Evidence are analogous to the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
190
See Stew Smith, Military Commissioned Officer Promotions, THE BALANCE CAREERS
(July 17, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/military-commissioned-officer-promo
tions-4055887 [https://perma.cc/7XW8-7VEN] (noting that promotion to the rank of Captain
in all of the services typically takes four years and that nearly 100% qualify); see also
KIMBERLY JACKSON, KATHERINE L. KIDDER, SEAN MANN, WILLIAM H. WAGGY II,
NATASHA LANDER, S. REBECCA ZIMMERMAN, RAND CORP., RAISING THE FLAG:
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY APPROACHES TO GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER
DEVELOPMENT 53–55, 55 fig.4.2 (2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR4347.html [https://perma.cc/3HAS-VETR] (reporting that from 2008 to 2018, the average
years in service of rising Army officers in grade O-3/Captain was three years and O-4/Major
was eleven years, respectively); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-29, OFFICER PROMOTIONS
para. 2-7, at 7–8 (Sept. 9, 2020) (defining time in grade required for promotion to captain).
185
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responsible for 80 to 200 soldiers and 4 to 5 subordinate officers.191 Unit
commanders “lead military organizations and are primarily responsible for
ensuring mission readiness, to include maintaining good order and discipline
within military units.”192 They have the primary responsibility of leading
their unit and setting mission priorities, but they also manage personnel
administratively and have broad discretion to discipline troops, including
bringing criminal charges under military law. 193 In a sense, unit commanders
are workplace supervisors, HR managers, and prosecutors all in one. 194
When a soldier is suspected of misconduct, their unit commander has
three broad options to address the issue.195 The first is to take “administrative
action,” which is the first measure a commander typically will turn to when
addressing minor offenses.196 Administrative action may include oral or
written counseling, admonition, reprimands, training, withholding of
privileges, or a combination of these measures.197 Some of these measures
may be more or less formal, and administrative actions are technically
considered “corrective” actions rather than punishment. 198 However, some
See, e.g., Military Units, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Experience/
Military-Units/Army/#army [https://perma.cc/DQR4-LAKK] (last visited Dec. 10, 2020)
(noting that a typical Army Company is commanded by a Captain and comprised of 3 to 4
platoons of up to 200 personnel).
192
ROLE OF THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE ROLE OF
THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE RESPONSE SYSTEMS TO ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT
CRIMES PANEL 2 (2014) [hereinafter ROLE OF THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT],
https://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/public/docs/Reports/02_RoC/ROC_Report_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SHJ9-RC9G]. This subcommittee was created by the Secretary of Defense
on Sept. 23, 2012 as directed by Section 576(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013.
193
See U.S. ARMY, CRIMINAL LAW DESK BOOK: PRACTICING MILITARY JUSTICE 1–2 (2018)
(“Commanders have a wide variety of options available to them to deal with disciplinary
problems. These options include administrative actions ranging from an informal counseling .
. . to punitive options such as punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, and trial by court-martial.”).
194
See id. (“Prosecutorial discretion lies with the commander and not the judge advocate, a
concept unfamiliar to civilian practitioners who are more accustomed to prosecutorial
discretion being entrusted to a prosecuting attorney.”).
195
However, commanders have wide latitude not to take any action if they deem it unnecessary.
See MCM, supra note 184, at II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(1)) (“A commander may decide to take no
action on an offense. If charges have been preferred, they may be dismissed.”).
196
See id. (R.C.M 306(c)(2)) (“Administrative actions include corrective measures such as
counseling, admonition, reprimand, exhortation, disapproval, criticism, censure, reproach,
rebuke, extra military instruction, or the administrative withholding of privileges, or any
combination of the above.”).
197
Id.
198
The Manual for Courts-Martial states that administrative actions are “corrective measures
that promote efficiency and good order and discipline” and “are not punishment.” Id. at V-2
(¶ 1.g.), II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(2)). However, some administrative measures such as letters of
reprimand have been criticized as actually being de facto punishment in practice without
191
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administrative actions can have serious consequences for a service member’s
career progression by creating a permanent stain on their personnel file.199
Commanders can also initiate “administrative separation” proceedings, which
can result in a service member’s removal from the military.200 Commanders
have broad discretion to take corrective actions,201 even for more serious
administrative actions like a formal written reprimand placed in a soldier’s
personnel record.202 Such written reprimands must only meet federal records
standards,203 be “true and just,”204 and supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.205 Soldiers can apply to restrict access to unfavorable records if they
can show rehabilitation and the support of their commanding officer,206

significant due process protections, and even Congress states that “punitive administrative
action” can result following sex-related offenses. See Captain Mark E. Bojan, Bad Paper:
Reforming the Army Reprimand Process, 224 MIL. L. REV. 1150, 1154 (2016) (citing
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66 § 1745, 127
Stat. 672 (2013)).
199
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-37, UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION paras. 3-4(a)–
(b), at 4 (Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter ARMY REG. 600-37] (authorizing a General Officer
Order of Reprimand); see also Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170 (“[T]here is a widely-held
belief—by judge advocates who advise commanders, by soldiers generally, and by
civilians—that an OMPF-filed reprimand is a ‘career-killer.’”).
200
See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1180–81 (“The consequences of administrative separation
are severe, and may include loss of benefits, reduction in grade, and a characterization of
discharge of other than honorable (OTH) upon discharge or separation.”) .
201
See MCM, supra note 184, at II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(2)).
202
See, e.g., ARMY REG. 600-37, supra note 199, para. 2–5(a), at 2 (authorizing commanders
to “take appropriate action(s) . . . concerning members of their commands” with reference to
unfavorable information placed in a soldier’s personnel record).
203
Id. at 3–2(c) (providing that the unfavorable information “must meet [federal records
standards] of accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness.”).
204
Id. at 6–3(a)(4) (providing that soldiers who believe the unfavorable information filed in
their personnel record is “untrue or unjust” may submit an appeal requesting the removal of the
information and that such appeals must be supported by “clear and convincing evidence”).
205
Id. at 6–3(b)(1)(a) (providing that unfavorable information referred to a soldier’s
personnel record is investigated and evaluated by a review board (the Department of the
Army Suitability Evaluation Board (DASEB)), which determines if there is “credible
evidence to support a finding, by preponderance of the evidence, that the unfavorable
information is valid”). The DASEB can close a case if it determines that the information is
already adequately reflected in the soldier’s personnel file or is not of such a serious nature
or type that it should be filed in the record. Id. at 6–3(c)(2)(a)–(c). It can also decide that the
unfavorable information is of such a serious nature that it should be made a part of the
soldier’s record. Id. at 6–3(b)(1)(b). In making its determination, the DASEB “will consider
serious individual incidents, as well as a pattern of lesser incidents, that may reflect
unfavorably on the Soldier’s character, integrity, trustworthiness, or reliability.” Id.
206
For example, in the Army, a soldier who believes the unfavorable information in their
personnel record has “served [its] intended purpose[]” may request that the unfavorable
information be transferred to the “restricted” portion of their personnel file. Id. at 6–3(a)(5).
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although in practice this remedy is rare. 207
The next form of action a commander can take is “nonjudicial
punishment” under Article 15 of the UCMJ. Colloquially referred to as an
“Article 15” or “NJP,” this is a form of punishment typically used for minor
offenses under military law, somewhat analogous to misdemeanor offenses
in civilian criminal law.208 This is considered a punitive rather than corrective
measure, but the punishment is “nonjudicial” because the soldier will not be
facing court-martial, and punishment under Article 15 does not result in a
federal criminal conviction. 209 The Manual for Courts-Martial states that
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 is meant to act as a disciplinary
measure when administrative corrections are inadequate but a commander
wishes to “promote[] positive behavior changes . . . without the stigma of a
court-martial conviction.”210 This gives a commander the ability to punish
soldiers for minor offenses without the more time-consuming and (careerkilling) process of a court-martial.211 Interestingly, Article 15 of the UCMJ
does not proscribe a particular burden of proof; rather, different branches of
the military have set their own standards as a matter of policy. 212 For example,
the Navy uses a preponderance standard for Article 15 punishments, whereas
the Army and Air Force use a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard as in

Among other requirements, the soldier’s chain of command at the time of the imposition of
the reprimand must support the record(s)’ transfer. Id. at 7–2(e)(3). Such transfers are made
upon a finding of substantial evidence that the purpose of the document has been served and
transfer is in the “best interest of the Army.” Id. at 7–2(d)(1)(b)–(c). Once transferred,
restricted records will “not normally serve as the sole basis for promotion” decisions. Id. at
7–2(d)(3)(e).
207
See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1175–76 (noting that appeals are limited to soldiers grade
E-6 and above, and stating that appeal standards are “exceedingly high,” with remedies
beyond appeal to the DASEB being even more “rarified”).
208
What constitutes a “minor offense” is, again, up the commander’s discretion, but they are
typically offenses under a punitive Article (Articles 77–134) where the maximum penalty
would not include dishonorable discharge or confinement for 1 year. See MCM, supra note
184, at V-1–V-4 (outlining the procedures, limitations, and maximum punishments for
nonjudicial punishment).
209
See id. at V-1 (“Nonjudicial punishment provides commanders with an essential and
prompt means of maintaining good order and discipline and also promotes positive behavior
changes in Servicemembers without the stigma of a court-martial conviction.”).
210
See id.; see also Katherine Gorski, Comment, Nonjudicial Punishment in the Military: Why
a Lower Burden of Proof Across All Branches is Unnecessary, 2 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 83, 91 (2013).
211
Gorski, supra note 210, at 89.
212
See id.; see also LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 155–
56 (2010) (noting the silence of Article 15 on the burden of proof standard and summarizing
burdens commonly adopted by each military branch).
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criminal courts-martial.213 There are maximum penalties under Article 15,
but these could include forfeiture of pay or a reduction in rank. 214
Finally, commanding officers may recommend charges for courtmartial.215 Three types of courts-martial exist, though all are criminal in
nature. The first is a Summary Court-Martial, where the unit commander
alone hears evidence and decides guilt or innocence, and the soldier is not
afforded counsel or a jury. Summary Courts-Martial are limited in scope and
reserved for minor offenses.216 Next is a Special Court-Martial, which is
analogous to a civilian misdemeanor offense and proceeding. Sometimes a
military judge sitting alone will hear the case; other times a trial counsel and
jurors become involved.217 The last kind of court-martial is a General CourtMartial and would be analogous to a civilian felony judicial proceeding.
General Courts-Martial entail a military judge, counsel, and jurors, as well as
a preliminary hearing before neutral officers to determine if there is probable
cause to believe that the accused committed the offense.218 A guilty verdict by
General Court-Martial is a federal criminal conviction under the United States
Code and can be reported on the guilty party’s record.219 The offenses triable
by court-martial are listed in Articles 77–134 of the UCMJ, referred to as the

213

See SCHLUETER, supra note 184, § 3-5(A)(2); Gorski, supra note 210, at 87, 89–90.
See 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (noting that, while maximum punishments depend on the rank of
commanding officer and rank of the individual being punished, forfeiture of pay is typically
limited to not more than one half of one month’s pay for two months, and reduction of rank
can be to the lowest rank for enlisted personnel, except for noncommissioned officers, where
rank cannot be reduced more than two pay grades).
215
See MCM, supra note 184, at II-48–II-49 (R.C.M. 407(a)(4), –(6)).
216
Id. at II-198 (R.C.M. 1301(b)) (noting that the function of the summary court-martial is
to “promptly adjudicate minor offenses under a simple disciplinary proceeding” and to
“thoroughly and impartially inquire into both sides of the matter,” ensuring that the “interests
of both the Government and the accused are safeguarded and that justice is done.”).
217
See id. at II-51–II-52 (R.C.M. 502(d)(1)(B)) (detailing the activities of trial counsel in
Special Courts-Martial); id. at II-50 (R.C.M. 501(a)(2)) (detailing the composition of the
body presiding over a Special Court-Martial).
218
Id. at chs. III–VIII (R.C.M. 301–813) (describing the court-martial process).
219
Court-martial convictions are recorded and reported to the Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) Division of the FBI for inclusion in the FBI’s criminal history database (the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database) for dissemination to state and local
law enforcement agencies. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 5505.11, FINGERPRINT
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 6 (Oct. 31, 2019); About NCIC, NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION
CENTER (NCIC), https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic [https://perma.cc/PD37-MYYP] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2021). Additionally, a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, which are
punishments for a court-martial conviction, must be indicated by a “character code” on a
servicemember’s DD-214, the official record of service frequently requested by civilian
employers. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1336.01, CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE OR DISCHARGE
FROM ACTIVE DUTY 10, 13 (Aug. 20, 2009).
214
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“Punitive Articles.” Each Article lists the elements for the offense at issue.220 In
all types of courts-martial, guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.221
b. A punitive article for sexual harassment
Former Secretary of Defense Shanahan’s recommendation to add a
punitive article for sexual harassment is significant because, unlike sexual
assault—which is specifically punishable as a crime under Article 120—
sexual harassment does not have an associated punitive article. 222 This has
meant that a service member could not be directly court-martialed for
engaging in sexual harassment, even though the Department of Defense has
a strict no-tolerance policy related to sexual harassment. Therefore, conduct
that would otherwise constitute sexual harassment can be tried as a punitive
offense by court-martial only by shoehorning it into the elements of other
UCMJ offenses.223 Essentially, it is a prosecution of conduct that may be
interpreted as sexual harassment in a civilian workplace but which violates
another crime under the UCMJ.224
One of the more common punitive articles used to prosecute sexual
harassment is Article 93, “Cruelty and Maltreatment.”225 Article 93.a. states
that “[a]ny person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or
oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.”226 Article 93.c.(2) does provide
clarification that “sexual harassment may constitute this offense.”227
However, because the maltreated individual must be “subject to the orders”
of the accused, the sexual harasser must have formal or informal authority

220

See MCM, supra note 184, at IV-1–IV-151 (Articles 77–134) (codified at 10 U.S.C §§
877–934) (listing and describing the offenses that may be tried by court-martial).
221
Id. at II-134 (R.C.M. 918(c)); id. at A8-7.
222
SAAITF REPORT, supra note 140, at 18.
223
See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 178–79.
224
See J. Richard Chema, Arresting “Tailhook”: The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment in
the Military, 140 MIL. L. REV. 1, 43–58 (1994) (exploring the use of existing UCMJ articles
to punish sexual harassment―such as articles on maltreatment, rape, carnal knowledge,
sodomy, assault, indecent assault, abusing a position of authority, fraternization, conduct
unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman, violating general orders, extortion, and use of
indecent language―and the mismatch between the offense of sexual harassment and the
articles examined in many instances).
225
MCM, supra note 184, at IV–29 (Art. 93) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 893).
226
Id. The elements of the offense are: “(1) that a certain person was subject to the orders of
the accused, and (2) that the accused was cruel toward, or oppressed, or maltreated that person.”
227
Id. Further, sexual harassment is defined in this subsection to include “influencing, offering
to influence, or threatening the career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for sexual
favors” (i.e., “quid pro quo” sexual harassment) and “deliberate or repeated offensive
comments or gestures of a sexual nature” (i.e., “hostile work environment” sexual harassment).
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over the victim.228 This may address classic quid pro quo sexual harassment
or sexual harassment by a supervising officer, but it precludes prosecution of
peer-to-peer harassment in the normal course. This limitation is especially
problematic, since sexual misconduct in the military occurs most often
between junior enlisted service members who are peers or near peers in
rank.229 Such imprecision demonstrates the problem of having to fit sexual
harassment into existing punitive articles that do not specifically address
sexual harassment.230
Furthermore, sexual harassment has at times been tried by courtmartial under UCMJ Article 92, “Failure to Obey a Lawful Order or
Regulation,”231 since sexual harassment is prohibited by regulation in all
branches of the Armed Forces. 232 However, only violations of “punitive”
regulations can be charged as a “failure to obey” offense under Article 92. 233
“Punitive” in this context refers to the fact that not all regulations are meant
to result in criminal punishment for a failure to follow them. 234 Military
regulations contain a vast array of general guidelines of a technical, advisory,

Id. (Art. 93.c.(1)) (“‘Any person subject to his orders’ means not only those persons under
the direct or immediate command of the accused but extends to all persons, subject to the
UCMJ or not, who by reason of some duty are required to obey the lawful orders of the accused,
regardless of whether the accused is in the direct chain of command over the person.”).
229
See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 23
(“Alleged perpetrators are often the same rank, or slightly higher, than the victim.”).
230
See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 178–83 (“Although the UCMJ offers some possibilities
for prosecuting sexual harassment, until Congress chooses to expressly prohibit sexual
harassment in the punitive articles of the UCMJ, many prosecutions will fail for lack of an
appropriate provision, ‘leaving military prosecutors to leap Herculean legal hurdles.’”).
231
See, e.g., United States v. Murray, No. 201800163, 2019 WL 6608798, at *2 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2019). Article 92.a(1) states that “[a]ny person subject to this chapter
who . . . violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation . . . shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct.” MCM, supra note 184, at IV–27 (Art. 92) (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 892). The elements of the offense are: “(a) That there was in effect a certain lawful
general order or regulation; (b) That the accused had a duty to obey it; and (c) That the
accused violated or failed to obey the order or regulation.” Id.
232
See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY (July 24, 2020)
[hereinafter ARMY REG. 600-20]; U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, POL’Y DIR. 36-27, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY (Mar. 18, 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, U.S. NAVY REGS., 1990, art. 1166
(Sept. 14, 1990).
233
See MCM, supra note 184, at IV-28 (¶ 18.c.(1)(e)) (“Not all provisions in general orders or
regulations can be enforced under Article 92(1). Regulations which only supply general guidelines
or advice for performing military functions may not be enforceable under Article 92(1).”).
234
See U.S. v. Nardell, 45 C.M.R. 101, 103 (C.M.A. 1972) (“No single characteristic of a
general order [or regulation] determines whether it applies punitively to members of a
command. . . . The order in its entirety must demonstrate that rather than providing general
guidelines for the conduct of military functions it is basically intended to regulate conduct of
individual members and that its direct application of sanctions for its violation is self-evident.”).
228

456

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[March 2021

or organizational nature.235 Because due process requires fair notice that an
act is criminal before prosecution, 236 military courts have required clear,
direct language of prohibition in regulations for a criminal conviction under
Article 92.237 This principle has generated a split among the services as to
whether military regulations proscribing sexual harassment are punitive.
For example, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals has
determined that the Navy regulation prohibiting sexual harassment is
punitive, thus allowing violations of the Navy’s sexual harassment regulation
to be charged under Article 92. 238 Recently, the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals came to a similar conclusion. 239 Conversely, a 1990 Army appellate

235

See Captain John B. DiChiara, USAF, Article 92: Judicial Guidelines for Identifying
Punitive Orders and Regulations, 17 A.F. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (1975).
236
See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757 (1974).
237
See DiChiara, supra note 235, at 63.
238
United States v. Olivares, No. 201800125, 2019 WL 1076454, at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
Mar. 7, 2019) (en banc) (per curiam), review denied, 79 M.J. 187 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (“We find
that the term sexual harassment [in Article 1166, U.S. Navy Regulations] is sufficiently
precise as to be capable of serving as a code of behavior that service members can be
expected to follow. . . . We find, therefore, that the military judge erred by determining that
Article 1166 is not a punitive general regulation.”). Olivares was an interlocutory appeal
concerning a charge that the defendant said to a PO2 “‘let me see that ass’ [then] kissed her
and touched her buttocks.” Id. at *4. See also United States v. Murray, No. 201800163, 2019
WL 6608798, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2019) (reasoning that the holding in
Olivares equally applies to the Marine Corps as a component of the Navy); United States v.
Rosario, NMCCA 201500251, 2015 WL 9942096, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 27,
2015) (upholding the conviction of a Marine sergeant under Article 92 for repeatedly
expressing his romantic interest in a corporal, asking her how often she has sex with her
husband, making a copy of her apartment key and threatening to “come over,” and kissing
her and sticking his tongue in her ear, among other unwelcome conduct; “considering all the
relevant facts . . . we have no difficulty concluding that a person of ordinary intelligence
could reasonably understand the regulation [Marine Corps Manual and Navy Instruction
5300.26] proscribed the appellant’s conduct.”); United States v. Jackson, NMCCA
200900427, 2010 WL 2059046, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. May 25, 2010) (upholding
special court-martial for violation of Navy regulation prohibiting sexual harassment and
UCMJ Articles 92 and 120).
239
United States v. Da Silva, No. ACM 39599, 2020 WL 3468282, at *10 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. June 25, 2020) (upholding the conviction of an Air Force recruiter under Article 92 for
making sexual advances on two female recruits after driving them to remote locations in his
car; military case law, regulations, policies, and recruiter training, as well as Title VII
regulations, put the defendant on fair notice that his conduct constituted “making sexual
advances” and sexual harassment, subject to criminal sanction); United States v. Pope, 63
M.J. 68, 72–74 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (upholding the conviction of an Air Force recruiter under
Article 92 for coming on to three recruits, ages sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen; Air Force
Instruction AETCI 36-2002 proscribing hostile work environment sexual harassment
“provided ample discussion of the types of behavior prohibited by the regulation and a
reasonable person would have been on notice that misconduct of the sort engaged in by
Appellant was subject to criminal sanction.”).
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decision, United States v. Asman,240 held that the Army regulation prohibiting
sexual harassment is not punitive in nature. The DOD and the Army have
subsequently issued many regulations and instructions clearly defining and
proscribing sexual harassment, and the other services have held that sexual
harassment is chargeable under Article 92, calling the continued viability of
Asman into question. However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services
(the highest military court) has declined to weigh in. Thus, it seems that
charges under Article 92 for sexual harassment remain unavailable in the
Army. Prosecuting sexual harassment under Article 134, the “catch-all” of
the UCMJ prohibiting conduct prejudicial to “good order and discipline,”241
has been largely unsuccessful. 242 In sum, sexual harassment in the Armed
Forces has been ineffectively addressed through a patchwork of policies and
ancillary criminal provisions in the UCMJ.
C. Assessing the Military’s Response
The CATCH program and the criminalization of sexual harassment
are steps in the right direction. But these reforms fall short in fundamental
respects and are therefore unlikely to effectively address—and may even
exacerbate—sexual harassment in the military. In the discussion that follows,
we highlight the features of these proposals that are commendable, while
noting several critical shortfalls that render them impractical, ill-fitting, and
ineffective. We offer this analysis with the hope that the military will correct
See United States v. Asfeld, 30 M.J. 917, 922 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (reasoning that U.S. Dep’t
of Army Reg. 600-21, the precursor to the current Army regulation prohibiting sexual
harassment, Reg. 600-27, was non-punitive, because it was only incorporated by reference
into the Army’s main EEO regulation, Army Reg. 600-50).
241
Jane Gross, Justice in the Military Has Its Reasons, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1998), https:// www.
nytimes.com/1998/03/01/us/justice-in-the-military-has-its-reasons.html [https://perma.cc/
ZW5J-CGBY] (“Article 134 is the catch-all of this nation’s military justice system, a
compendium of 55 offenses that the armed forces say are ‘prejudicial to good order and
discipline’ or likely to ‘bring discredit’ on the service.”).
242
See, e.g., United States v. Peszynski, 40 M.J. 874, 879–880 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1994).
(overturning a conviction of a service member who subjected female co-workers at a Pizza
Hut aboard a Naval air station to “a nearly constant stream of sexually suggestive comments
and other forms of sexually suggestive behavior,” including “making frequent reference to
their breasts and buttocks,” “ask[ing] them out socially,” “star[ing] leeringly at their bodies,”
and “touching or stroking” them in a “sexually suggestive” manner, over a five month period,
even though “[e]ach victim made it clear to the appellant that she wanted him to stop”; such
“[c]omments and gestures . . . are not inherently criminal or even necessarily pejorative in nature;
they are basically neutral. As such, they do not serve as an adequate standard by which to
determine criminal behavior.”); cf. United States v. Creighton, No. Army 20010208, 2003 WL
25945393, at *2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 2003) (overturning a conviction of an unmanned
aerial vehicle instructor for engaging in an unprofessional relationship with trainees, including
driving two females in his car off base and engaging in sexual intercourse with a trainee, finding
“no convincing evidence” that his conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline).
240
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these flaws in its existing programs and undertake additional reforms
responding to sexual harassment.
1. The downsides of anonymous reporting
The CATCH program incorporates several features that may enhance
the military’s ability to identify and address sexual misconduct. However, it
also has several design flaws, which we discuss here. Without more
fundamental reforms in the military justice system, such as assigning
independent authority to investigate and discipline sexual harassment outside
the chain of command 243 and making compensatory damages for sexual
harassment available,244 our assessment is that CATCH does not add much
to the military’s response to sexual misconduct.
Assessing CATCH in its most favorable light, feminist experts on sex
crimes and violence against women have highlighted how mandatory arrest
and “no-drop” prosecution policies require victims to hand over power to a
potentially unfriendly justice system in order to obtain redress.245 In this
regard, the CATCH design is congruent with these feminist critiques. It gives
victims more agency and control over the process by offering them a way to
report sexual harassment without exposing themselves to a full-blown
adversarial process. A victim’s ability to report anonymously may be even
more critical in the military than in civilian workplaces, given that retaliation
for reporting sexual misconduct in the military is rampant.246 Indeed, the
military’s most recent workplace gender relations survey finds that service
members value the option of restricted reporting. “Without the option to make
a restricted report, only 11% of women . . . responded that they would have
sought out civilian confidential resources, and nearly half of women . . .
responded that they would not have submitted a report [of sexual assault] at
all.”247 The CATCH program is also an excellent data collection tool,
enabling the military to track the prevalence of sexual misconduct and
identify repeat offenders.
Despite these clear benefits, the CATCH program can be criticized on
several grounds. As currently designed, the CATCH system permits the
military to sit on information demonstrating serious crimes, repeat offenses,
and systemic sex discrimination if a victim does not file an unrestricted
report. This system irrationally relieves the military of responsibility even if
243

See discussion infra Section III.A.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
245
See GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 20; G. Kristian
Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of
the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 293–302, 321–23 (2005).
246
See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
247
See 2018 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at vii.
244
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it knows of the conduct. And by placing the onus on victims to make formal
unrestricted reports before the military responds to a complaint,248 the
program unfairly places the burden on victims to take the lead in addressing
what is more accurately characterized as a systemic, institutional problem. In
practice, this design leaves a victim with fundamentally the same dilemma
they had before the military implemented CATCH. If a victim wants the
military to investigate a claim of sexual misconduct, they must formally
involve their chain of command, presenting the same high risk of retaliation
or adverse treatment. 249 While the CATCH system is designed to “empower
victims to participate in the military justice process,”250 it places victims in the
difficult position of knowing that a repeat offender could remain at large if they
choose not to expose themselves to the military justice system and their chain
of command. Ultimately, without more fundamental reform of the military
justice system,251 the CATCH program is unlikely to disrupt the current barriers
to making an unrestricted, nonanonymous report.
An extensive body of research in the civilian context documents why
people who experience sexual harassment (primarily women) do not report
the harassment or delay reporting. One of the primary reasons is shame and
embarrassment, which often causes the person to blame themselves for the
misconduct.252 We all want to believe that we have control over what happens
to us. When that personal power is challenged by a violation, a victim feels
humiliation253 and shame,254 often accompanied by an intense fear of
exposure.255 As a result of this discomfort, a person often will decide to keep
See CATCH VICTIM INFO SHEET, supra note 170 (“If you decide to convert your report to an
Unrestricted Report . . . the investigator is given your name at this time. A criminal investigation
is now started, and the suspect’s commander and your commander are notified.”).
249
Although conceivably there should be less fear of retaliation if the perpetrator is from a
different unit, or even a different branch of service, attaching one’s name to a formal sexual
assault complaint is still a significant step for a victim, as it involves direct leadership. Those
who file complaints may still be perceived as “making problems.”
250
See Lopez, supra note 168, at 5 (quoting Elizabeth Van Winkle, Executive Director of
DOD’s Office of Force Resiliency in discussing the purpose of Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response programs).
251
See discussion infra Part III proposing reforms to the military justice system that would
remove sexual harassment investigations and punishment decisions from the chain of
command, rely on UCMJ administrative actions employing a civil burden of proof to address
sexual harassment, and make compensatory damages available to victims.
252
See Beverly Engel, Why Don’t Victims of Sexual Harassment Come Forward Sooner?,
PSYCH. TODAY (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-compassionchronicles/201711/why-dont-victims-sexual-harassment-come-forward-sooner [https://perma.cc/
EN36-EZUX].
253
Id.
254
See Gershen Kaufman, The Meaning of Shame: Toward a Self-Affirming Identity, 21 J.
COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 568, 569 (1974).
255
Id.
248
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the information about sexual harassment or assault to themselves, avoid the
perpetrator, and try to forget the experience ever happened. 256 Fear is also a
significant obstacle to reporting. Fear of not being believed, of being labeled
as a troublemaker, of retaliation, and that reporting will not improve the
situation all contribute to a victim’s decision not to report or to delay in
reporting.257 These fears are entirely rational, as many studies demonstrate
that disbelief, refusal, and retaliation are common responses when individuals
complain about sexual assault and harassment.258 Because of their double
vulnerability, Black women are even less likely to report sexual harassment
than white women.259
256

Id.
See Beiner, supra note 22, at 312–25 (discussing studies on the reasons that the vast
majority of harassment victims do not report, including fears that they will lose their jobs,
that they will not be believed, and that it will not help their situations); Hébert, supra note
22, at 724–42 (identifying discomfort and embarrassment, fear of being labeled as a
troublemaker, not being believed, threats of termination, fear of retaliation, and concerns
about physical safety as reasons, among others, for not reporting sexual harassment); Kessler,
supra note 22, at 1048 (discussing workplace power dynamics and economic vulnerabilities
that lead victims not to report harassment); Engel, supra note 252 (“Fear of the repercussions
is a huge obstacle women face when it comes to reporting sexual harassment or assault . . . .”).
258
See Mindy E. Bergman, Regina Day Langhout, Patrick A. Palmieri, Lilia M. Cortina &
Louise F. Fitzgerald, The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences
of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 230, 233, 237 (2002) (noting that
“organizational responses may function as a continuation of the harassing behavior” and
finding, in a study of 6417 military personnel, that reporting sexual harassment “often
triggers retaliation”); Lauren B. Edelman & Jessica Cabrera, Sex-Based Harassment and
Symbolic Compliance, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 374 (2020) (“HR professionals
frequently discourage women who inquire about filing a complaint from framing their
complaints as sexual harassment, instead suggesting that the behavior is not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to constitute sexual harassment or that it is simply an instance of poor
management or of interpersonal conflict.”); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment:
Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48 AM. PSYCH. 1070, 1072 (1993) (“As with
rape, women are commonly blamed for provoking sexual harassment and accounts of their
experiences are routinely disbelieved.”); Jeong-Yeon Lee, Sharon Gibson Heilmann & Janet
P. Near, Blowing the Whistle on Sexual Harassment: Test of a Model of Predictors and
Outcomes, 57 HUM. RELS. 297, 318 (2004) (concluding, based on a study of 13,000 federal
government employees, that “many cases of harassment do not end after the initial
harassment but continue, as the target blows the whistle about the harassment and then
suffers retaliation—a result that is entirely consistent with findings from earlier whistleblowing research”); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness
and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SOC. REV. 83, 98–105 (2005)
(finding that complaint handlers in a university setting frequently sided with harassers and
told employees who sought their help that their experiences were not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to be considered sexual harassment); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women:
Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1 passim (2017)
(discussing the deeply skeptical orientation toward rape accusers and examining the
implications of this credibility discounting for institutional reform and law).
259
See Hernández, supra note 22, at 1244–45.
257

Vol. 6:3]

Sexual Harassment is Not a Crime

461

These psychological dynamics and obstacles are exacerbated in the
military setting. Service members are taught discipline, focus, and control
from the first day of their training; 260 they are “expected to be disciplined in
their actions and words and to maintain control of their emotions and their
physical selves at all times.” 261 This culture is inconsistent with admitting
vulnerability and violation, especially for female service members who may
already feel that they are unwelcome and must prove themselves by being as
tough as their male peers.
Additionally, unit cohesiveness is essential, not just for mission
efficiency, but also the core military value “[l]eave no one behind.”262 Service
members are trained so that “[n]o soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine will be
left on the field of battle,” even if that means disregarding a member’s own
safety.263 Reporting misconduct by another service member in one’s unit
disrupts this system of cohesion and sacrifice.
Finally, and importantly, in a military workplace, the chain of
command is king, a principle ingrained from the instant an individual first
puts on a uniform. Service members are trained to operate within this strict,
hierarchal system.264 Each service member is assigned a commanding officer
responsible for addressing that individual’s concerns or problems. “‘Jumping
the chain of command’ in most situations is strictly forbidden and may result
in formal or informal disciplinary action.”265 This hierarchy creates severe
barriers to reporting sexual misconduct when the alleged perpetrator is a
service member’s commander, further multiplied because the victim must
rely on the commander for their safety and well-being.266 In this way, the
chain of command in the military functions in many respects as a cage,
making it difficult if not impossible to go over a supervisor’s head when the
supervisor is the harasser.
These unique features of military culture further entrench and
exacerbate common barriers to reporting sexual harassment. In the face of
such extreme barriers, CATCH, by itself, does not seem to contribute much
to the military’s response to sexual misconduct. We do not doubt that the
CATCH will induce increased anonymous reporting, and preliminary data
suggest that it has had this effect. 267 Moreover, filing a restricted report
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SVC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SVCS.,
UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY: THE INSTITUTION, THE CULTURE, AND THE PEOPLE 10 (2010).
261
Id.
262
Id. at 9.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 8.
265
Id.
266
Id. at 13.
267
See DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, APP. B, supra note 146, at 7 (reporting
a 17% increase in restricted (anonymous) reports in FY 2019 compared to FY 2018).
260
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enables victims to access confidential counseling and health services.268 The
CATCH program may also increase perceptions that the military treats
victims with dignity and respect by affording privacy, confidentiality, and
decisional autonomy. Increased confidence may, in turn, encourage more
victims or witnesses of sexual misconduct to come forward.269 The CATCH
system also gives victims time to seek relevant information and support in
order to make more informed decisions about participating in an unrestricted
(nonanonymous) criminal investigation. 270 This additional time may
eventually lead the victim to decide to pursue an investigation and convert a
restricted report to an unrestricted one.271
But there are serious limitations to restricted reporting. First, the
perpetrator cannot be held accountable and may be capable of assaulting
other victims.272 In addition, victims cannot receive a military protective
order or request an expedited transfer without making an unrestricted
report.273 Moreover, the victim may continue to have contact with the
perpetrator. Finally, although a victim may, at any time, convert a restricted
report to an unrestricted report,274 thereby triggering the investigation
process, the delay in switching to an unrestricted report will likely present
“significant obstacles” in the investigation. 275 For example, evidence from
any crime scene could be lost.276 More broadly, in the current environment
and institutional context―that is, where unit commanders handle sexual
misconduct investigations,277 retaliation for reporting is common,278 no
formal action results from filing an anonymous report, and economic
remedies are unavailable to victims―the primary function of CATCH seems
to be “catching” data rather than perpetrators. Again, CATCH is a step in the
right direction; it provides a mechanism to identify repeat offenders and
connect victims with services. But it is not enough. More fundamental
reforms to the UCMJ are necessary to create a meaningful response that
deters sexual harassment and holds perpetrators accountable.279
268

Id. at 5.
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
(SAPR) PROGRAM PROCEDURES 39 (Sept. 11, 2020).
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
See Restricted Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION &
RESPONSE, https://sapr.mil/restricted-reporting [https://perma.cc/5VR5-9VUR] (last visited
Nov. 25, 2020).
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
279
See discussion infra Part III.
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2. Criminalization: too much and too little
The Department of Defense’s call to add a punitive article for sexual
harassment to the UCMJ is, no doubt, a response to external criticisms and
awareness of its failure to effectively address sexual misconduct. Military
lawyers have also proposed this reform.280 However, adding sexual
harassment to the UCMJ is quite a bit more complicated than meets the eye.
Congress and military courts will have to sort out several significant legal
issues, both substantive and procedural, if a direct avenue for criminal
prosecution of sexual harassment in the military is to be established.281
First, the elements of a criminal sexual harassment offense would
have to be defined. The Department of Defense did not elaborate on this when
it recommended a new punitive article covering this conduct.282 While it is
true that the military has historically criminalized some behavior that is not
criminal in civilian society,283 this does not provide guidance as to how sexual
harassment would be treated as a criminal offense under the UCMJ.

280

See e.g., Hollywood, supra note 184, at 184–85. Proposals to add a stand-alone article to
the UCMJ outlawing sexual harassment go back all the way to the 1980s. See SHIRLEY
SAGAWA & NANCY DUFF CAMPBELL, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 8 (1992) (explaining that the Navy proposed amending the UCMJ
in the wake of Tailhook).
281
Because criminal offenses under the UCMJ are listed in Title 10 of U.S. Code, the
Department of Defense cannot unilaterally alter or create new offenses. However, it may
make recommendations or propose drafts of new article to Congress. See e.g., SAAITF
REPORT, supra note 140, at 17–19 (recommending that the Joint Service Committee for
Military Justice draft a proposal of a specific sexual harassment offense to be added to the
Manual for Courts-Martial).
282
This is true both in the Memo from Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, as well as the
underlying recommendation from the Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task
Force in 2019. See Shanahan Memorandum, supra note 154, at 1 (“Implement the
recommendations of the SAAITF Report, including taking steps to seek a stand-alone
military crime of sexual harassment.”); see also SAAITF REPORT, supra note 140, at 19
(2019) (recommending only that a proposal be drafted with no further details).
283
For example, adultery is a criminal offense under the UCMJ, albeit narrowed in scope
since 2002. See MCM, supra note 184, at IV-144–IV-146 (Article 134) (detailing that
extramarital sexual conduct may be punished by “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all
pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.”); Exec. Order No. 13,262, 3 C.F.R. 210
(2003) (“To constitute an offense under the UCMJ, the adulterous conduct must either be
directly prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. Adulterous conduct
that is directly prejudicial includes conduct that has an obvious, and measurably divisive
effect on unit or organization discipline, morale, or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the
authority or stature of or respect toward a servicemember.”); see also MCM, supra note 184,
at IV-145 (Article 134), ¶ 99.c.(1). Similarly, fraternization, gambling with a subordinate,
indecent language, and violating orders (e.g., sexual relations onboard a ship), all are
potentially subject to criminal sanction under Articles 134 and 92, respectively. Id. at IV127, IV-146–IV-148.
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So far, the Department of Defense has defined sexual harassment only
as a matter of policy through Directives (“DODD”s)284 and Instructions
(“DODI”s),285 which establish DOD policies and procedures and are binding
284

Sexual harassment was first defined by the Department of Defense in 1988 in Directive
1350.2. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 1350.2, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM enc. 2 para. 10 (Dec. 23, 1988) [hereinafter DODD 1350.2] (on file
with authors). The original directive stated:
DEFINITIONS. . . .
10. Sexual Harassment. A form of sex discrimination that involves
unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
a. submission to or rejection of such conduct is made either
explicitly implicitly a term or condition of a person's job, pay, or
career, or
b. submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as
a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person, or
c. such conduct interferes with an individual’s performance or
creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.
Any person in a supervisory or command position who uses or
condones implicit or explicit sexual behavior to control, influence, or
affect the career, pay, or job of a military member or civilian employee is
engaging in sexual harassment.
Similarly, any military member or civilian employee who makes
deliberate or repeated unwelcomed verbal comments, gestures, or physical
contact of a sexual nature is also engaging in sexual harassment.
Id. This directive was revised in 1995 with the addition of language stating:
[W]orkplace conduct, to be actionable as “abusive work environment”
harassment, need not result in concrete psychological harm to the victim,
but rather need only be so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person
would perceive, and the victim does perceive, the work environment as
hostile or offensive. (“Workplace” is an expansive term for Military
members and may include conduct on or off duty, 24 hours a day.)
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 1350.2, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
(MEO) PROGRAM para. E2.1.15.3, at 18 (Aug. 18, 1995), https://www.esd.whs.mil/
Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/135002p.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS35-SNCH].
In 2020, President Trump repealed DODD 1350.2, reissued it as an “Instruction,”
and deleted the definition of sexual harassment from the issuance. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
INST. 1350.02, DOD MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.
esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/135002p.pdf?ver=2020-09-04-1241
16-607 [https://perma.cc/KWX3-6XM4]. Presumably, this action will be reversed by
President Biden.
285
Department of Defense Instruction 1020.03, issued in 2018 and updated in 2020, contains
the most current DOD definition of sexual harassment, as follows:
GLOSSARY. . . .
[S]exual harassment. Conduct that:
Involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
deliberate or repeated offensive comments or gestures of a sexual nature
when:

Vol. 6:3]

Sexual Harassment is Not a Crime

465

on the services.286 Notwithstanding federal court precedent holding that Title
VII does not apply to Armed Service members,287 the definition of sexual
harassment in these various equal opportunity policy documents is drawn
almost directly from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines and Supreme Court cases interpreting Title VII.288 Commentators
Submission to such conduct is, either explicitly or implicitly,
made a term or condition of a person’s job, pay, or career[; or]
Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as
a basis for career or employment decisions affecting that person; or
Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Is so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and
the victim does perceive, the environment as hostile or offensive.
Any use or condonation, by any person in a supervisory or command
position, of any form of sexual behavior to control, influence, or affect the
career, pay, or job of a member of the Armed Forces or a civilian employee
of the Department of Defense.
Any deliberate or repeated unwelcome verbal comments or gesture of
a sexual nature by any member of the Armed Forces or a civilian employee
of the Department of Defense.
There is no requirement for concrete psychological harm to the
complainant for behavior to constitute sexual harassment. Behavior is
sufficient to constitute sexual harassment if it is so severe or pervasive that
a reasonable person would perceive, and the complainant does perceive,
the environment as hostile or offensive.
Sexual harassment can occur through electronic communications,
including social media, other forms of communication, and in person.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1020.03, HARASSMENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE
ARMED FORCES § G2 at 22 (Dec. 29, 2020) [hereinafter DODI 1020.03].
286
All of the services have implemented DODD 1350.2 and DODI 1020.03. See ARMY REG.
600-20, supra note 232, ch. 7 (July 24, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, POLICY DIRECTIVE
(AFPD) 36-27 (Mar. 18, 2019); SEC’Y OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION (SECNAVINST)
5300.26E (2020).
287
See notes 174–176 and accompanying text.
288
For example, the definition of sexual harassment in DODI 1020.03 is nearly identical to
EEOC Guidance on what constitutes discrimination because of sex under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Compare DODI 1020.03, supra note 285, with Discrimination Because of Sex
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980)
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2020)) (“Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment . . . .”); see also United States v. Olivares, No. 201800125, 2019 WL 1076454, at
*3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2019), (“Both the Department of Defense’s and the
Department of the Navy’s definitions [of sexual harassment] are very similar to the definition
promulgated in 1980 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission when it
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have suggested that this policy-based definition contained in DODD’s and
DODI’s could be used as the elements of a criminal sexual harassment
offense for the Armed Forces.289 However, as this definition is derived from
Title VII, which federal courts have held does not apply to service
members,290 it is not clear how this language would be utilized to prosecute
sexual harassment as a crime under the UCMJ. For example, will Title VII
case law apply in UCMJ sexual harassment prosecutions?291 More broadly,
determined that sexual harassment violated federal laws against sex discrimination . . . .”).
Along the same lines, the “severe or pervasive” standard in DODI 1020.03 codifies a key
holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that a hostile
environment occurs “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult’ . . . that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” DODI 1020.03 is also
derived from the holding of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), that the
plaintiff need not present evidence of a nervous breakdown to prove a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim. So long as the conduct can “reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile and abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically
injurious.” Id. at 22 (citation omitted). Note however that in contrast with Title VII, military
policy construes “workplace” very broadly to include any place service members might live,
work, train, and socialize together. See DODD 1350.2, supra note 284, at enc. 2 para. 10
(“‘Workplace’ is an expansive term for Military members and may include conduct on or off
duty, 24 hours a day.”); SAAITF REPORT, supra note 140, at 18 (recommending that a
specific sexual harassment offense for the military should encompass misconduct that occurs
outside the workplace too).
289
See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 185 n.290 (proposing that the elements of sexual
harassment be drawn from DODD 2020.03). Indeed, at least one military court took this
approach in an Article 92 adjudication. See Olivares, 2019 WL 1076454, at *3 (using the
definition of sexual harassment in DODD 1350.2 to determine the meaning of “sexual
harassment” in Navy Regulation, Article 1166).
290
See cases cited supra note 174.
291
Although an extensive discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this Article, we
will note that Title VII has already seeped into military law through the DOD’s incorporation
of Supreme Court precedents and EEOC Guidelines into its directives and instructions
proscribing sexual harassment, as well as through the services’ implementing regulations.
See sources cited supra note 288 and accompanying text. Military courts have, in turn, relied
on these policies and regulations to expand the scope of Article 92 of the UCMJ to cover
sexually harassing conduct. See sources cited supra notes 238–239. Recently, an
intermediate appellate military court even went so far as to directly reference EEOC sexual
harassment Guidelines in concluding that a service member had received fair notice that his
sexually harassing conduct could be subject to criminal sanctions under the UCMJ. See
United States v. Da Silva, No. ACM 39599, 2020 WL 3468282, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
June 25, 2020). We are heartened by these developments, which commentators seem to have
overlooked, for they suggest that Title VII already functions as a kind of shadow legal system
inside the UCMJ. That is, the military justice system has increasingly come to resemble its
civilian counterpart, notwithstanding federal courts’ judicial exclusion of service members
from Title VII’s protections. This suggests that a promising route to bring the UCMJ into
alignment with civil employment discrimination law may be through military policy,
regulations, and case law rather than direct overhaul of the UCMJ by Congress, which is
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will the many recent updates to Title VII be included in the criminal definition
of sexual harassment?292 Although these questions may seem moot given that
Title VII does not formally apply to armed service members, the fact remains
that the DOD has already fashioned its EEO policies in a manner largely
consistent with Title VII and relevant case law. These questions, therefore,
cannot be avoided. Moreover, military case law on sexual harassment has
involved other UCMJ articles, which have distinct elements.293
Questions about the controlling case law in prosecutions under a punitive
article for sexual harassment would surely arise if Congress were to criminalize
sexual harassment directly through a stand-alone article in the UCMJ. Of course,
Congress (and military courts applying and interpreting an updated penal
code) could address these questions. Resolving them, although complicated,
would not be insurmountable. However, to do so will require a deeper
consideration of the relationship of the Armed Forces and the equality norms
(established both in law and politics) of our larger democratic society.
The proposal to criminalize sexual harassment directly in the UCMJ
also raises significant procedural and practical issues. If the Department of
Defense is to take the matter of preventing and remedying sexual harassment
in the military seriously, it must reexamine its institutional design and
allocation of authority. The dilemma is how to do that in a fair and just
manner that strikes a balance between the military’s unique mission,
organizational structure, and rules, on the one hand, and the protection of
service members’ right to be free of sex (and sexuality) discrimination, on
always a politically fraught exercise. More broadly, one cannot but acknowledge that, like all
plural legal systems, the United States’ civilian legal system and military justice system are not
independent; they are “part of the same system in [a] particular social context and are . . .
intertwined in the same micro-social processes.” Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 869, 873 (1988) (paraphrasing remarks delivered by Francis Snyder at the
Bellagio Conference on People’s Law and State Law, 1981).
292
For example, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination includes same-sex sexual harassment, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), as well as harassment on the basis of an individual’s homosexual
or transgender status. Bostock v. Clayton Co., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Moreover, under
Supreme Court precedent interpreting Title VII, civilian employers are not vicariously liable
for sexual harassment if they can establish that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the
acts or that they promptly corrected the conduct after it became evident. See Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 778, 807–08 (1998). This defense has been subject to severe criticism by victims’
advocates for failing to account for the ways that power, identity, and institutional contexts
cause victims not to report. See sources cited supra note 22 and accompanying text. If
Congress codifies a legal standard for sexual harassment in the UCMJ, it will need to decide
whether this expansive defense is relevant in a setting where severe power inequalities are
inherent in the institutional design and formal policies of the workplace. Of course, Congress
could leave these questions for military courts to decide, and perhaps that is the most
politically feasible outcome, but that would be a lost opportunity.
293
See Hollywood, supra note 184, at 185.
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the other. DOD and Congress will also need to consider the practical effect
of employing a criminal burden of proof to address sexual harassment. That
is, will the proposed legal mechanism of direct criminalization (and,
potentially, court-martialing service members for sexual harassment) even
work to deter and remedy sexual misconduct? We turn to this second set of
questions here.
The latest feminist thinking about legal responses to sexual violence
centers around the idea that more collaborative, less adversarial legal models
are preferred.294 This idea has developed out of distinct but converging
critiques, including feminist reflections on the failures of criminal legal
responses to sexual violence, discomfort with certain aspects of the #MeToo
movement, and the effects of America’s ever-expanding criminal justice
system on people of color. Many feminists have lauded the increased public
attention to sexual harassment and gender violence that the #MeToo movement
has generated, yet others “have pushed back against the demands for a bigger
and better criminal response.”295 The objections to the use (and overuse) of
criminal law and new forms of regulation to address sexual violence and
harassment exist on a number of levels and emerge from distinct concerns.
Some feminists argue that feminist antiviolence work has contributed
to the build-up of policing and mass incarceration in our country.296 They
294

See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, The Restorative Workplace: An Organizational
Learning Approach to Discrimination, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 487 passim (2016) (drawing on
organizational management, conflict resolution theory, and antidiscrimination law to argue
that restorative justice practices may better advance the goals of antidiscrimination law than
the adversarial legal system); Goldscheid, supra note 23 (exploring the use of nonadversarial approaches to address sexual harassment in the workplace); Laurie S. Kohn,
#MeToo, Wrongs Against Women, and Restorative Justice, 28 KANS. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561,
576–85 (2019) (advocating restorative justice for workplace sexual harassment and assault).
295
Brenda Cossman, #MeToo, Sex Wars 2.0 and the Power of Law, in 3 ASIAN Y.B. HUM. RTS.
& HUMANITARIAN L. 18, 20 (Javaid Rehman, Ayesha Shahid & Steve Foster eds., 2019).
296
See, e.g., MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA: FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 111–51 (2000) (telling the story of how feminists were successful in
mainstreaming their concerns about rape, but their success was largely achieved through
appeal to law-and-order politics scapegoating and criminalizing men of color); GOODMARK,
DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 23, passim (arguing that domestic
violence has been overcriminalized to the detriment of victims and society and urging that
we use legal and criminal justice responses as a last resort within much more holistic,
therapeutic, resource-based approach to IPV); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 115–39 (2006) (detailing
the “long and conflicted history” of women’s groups and feminists on issues related to crime
and their role in uncritically pushing for increased policing); AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST
WAR ON CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS
INCARCERATION passim (2020) (analyzing ways in which the feminist movements’ work to
protect women from rape and domestic violence has contributed to mass incarceration);
Mimi Kim, Dancing the Carceral Creep: The Anti-Domestic Violence Movement and the
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point out that people of color, especially of low socioeconomic status, have
been disproportionately impacted by the fervor to criminalize domestic
violence, for example, including female victims, the very people antiviolence
advocates aim to emancipate. 297 Others “t[ake] issue with” the “negative
stance” on “sex and sexuality” implicit in much antiviolence work. 298 Some
critics, including those who identify as feminists, argue that the definitions of
sexual harassment governing the workplace, universities, and other major
societal institutions are too broad, potentially capturing consensual sexual
behavior.299 Finally, feminists working in the antiviolence movement have
come to see the ineffectiveness of punitive approaches and adversarial legal
processes for addressing sexual violence. That is, advocates now understand
that despite the massive body of law and regulatory infrastructures now in
place to address sexual assault, violence, and harassment in homes,
workplaces, schools, and on college campuses, the system does not prevent
violence or protect survivors when it occurs.300
Paradoxical Pursuit of Criminalization, 1973–1986, at 2 (Inst. Study Soc. Issues, Working Paper
No. 2013-2014.70, 2015), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/804227k6 [https://perma.cc/6L9NJ6QK] (“[A]ttempts to feminize the state led to the unwitting support for policies of mass
incarceration, thereby reproducing and re-enforcing hierarchies of gender, race, class and
sexuality . . . .”); cf. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 35–54 (2009) (asserting that a number of
worrisome trends have occurred in the wake of the “domestic violence revolution,” including
that criminal law now imposes “de facto divorce” through its enforcement of easily
obtainable protection orders).
297
See BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICA’S
PRISON NATION 99–124 (2012) (exploring the rise of the punishment industry in the United
States and the consequent mass incarceration of poor women and women of color who break
laws to survive abusive relationships); Goodmark, Stop Treating Domestic Violence
Differently, supra note 23 (“Encouraging a larger role for law enforcement also had the
unintended consequence of punishing victims.”).
298
See Cossman, supra note 295, at 20; Wendy Brown, Finding the Man in the State, 18
FEMINIST STUD. 7, 9 (1992) (critiquing the “politics of protection” that “construct[] [the]
divide between light and dark, wives and prostitutes, good girls and bad ones”); Jacob Gersen
& Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 882 (2016) (discussing “the
bureaucratic tendency to merge sexual violence and sexual harassment with ordinary sex, and
thus to trivialize a very serious problem”); cf. SUK, supra note 296, at 106–31 (arguing that
privacy law has been reimagined in the form of a vulnerable woman, with consequences that both
reinforce harmful gender roles and increase state control of intimate relationships in the home).
299
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003); cf.
Jeannie Suk Gersen, Nancy Gertner & Janet Halley, Comment Letter on Proposed Title IX
Rulemaking, at 14 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018OCR-0064-11950 [https://perma.cc/7LDC-CEKP] (arguing that President Trump’s
proposed Title IX Rule adopted a definition of sexual harassment that was both too narrow
and too broad).
300
Some are therefore turning to other models to address sexual violence, such as restorative
justice. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 23. Traditionally, restorative justice is an approach
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We focus here primarily on the last insight, as it is the most applicable
in the military context. It is not clear that punishing sexual harassment as a
crime under the UCMJ will deter sexual harassment. Sexual assault has
already been punishable as a punitive offense under UCMJ Article 120 for
decades, and as recent statistics show, this has not led to a significant
reduction of incidents.301 The same could likely be expected even if sexual
harassment receives its own punitive article.302 Some commentators have
noted that military unit commanders are under pressure to deal with sexual
offenses assertively, which has translated into seeking more severe judicial
punishment rather than nonjudicial punishment. 303 While the optics of
seeking stiff penalties for sexual offenses are intended to show that the
military is taking the problem seriously, these charges face a higher burden
of proof than the same behavior would face when disciplined with nonjudicial
penalties.304 Therefore, cases that could reliably be punished by nonjudicial
means are likely to go unpunished after an unsuccessful attempt to prosecute
as a punitive judicial offense. 305 This hypothesis is confirmed by a recent
study of sexual assault prosecutions in the military, which found that one
reason for the military’s low conviction rate for sex crimes is the high burden
of proof for obtaining a court-martial.306
to justice in which one of the responses to a crime is to organize a meeting between the victim
and the offender, sometimes with representatives of the wider community. Today, the term’s
use in many contexts has rendered its meaning somewhat blurred. However, some of its defining
features include resolution of disputes outside of courts (to facilitate truth telling), meaningful
accountability, efforts to disrupt (rather than punish) sexual misconduct, and nonjudgmental
measures that encourage reflection and acceptance of responsibility. Goldscheid, supra note 23,
manuscript at 15–19 (defining restorative justice). The modern usage of the term “restorative
justice” can be traced to Albert Eglash. DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS
STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 21–22 (5th ed.
2015). Albert Eglash was a psychologist in the 1950s working with incarcerated people. He
saw the need for his clients to be accountable for their behavior that hurt others and saw its
rehabilitation value. He first presented this idea in a 1975 restitution conference paper titled
Beyond Restitution–Creative Restitution, which was subsequently published in RESTITUTION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway
eds., 1977).
301
See discussion supra Section II.A.
302
Indeed, prosecutions of sexually harassing conduct under UCMJ Articles 92, 93, and 134
does not seem to have had any impact. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
303
See Seth Michael Engel, Fostering a Safe Warfighting Environment: Applying Title IX
and Student Discipline in Higher Education to the Military’s Fight Against Sexual Assault,
32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 133, 136 (2017).
304
Id.
305
See id. at 160 (arguing that overreliance on court-martial results in failure to punish
perpetrators of sexual assault because of the higher burden of proof in court-martial).
306
See Warner & Armstrong, supra note 146, at 294–95. While such constitutional due
process concerns justify a high evidentiary standard for criminal convictions, they are out of
place when the alleged offense is sexual harassment that does not involve criminal conduct.
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Even more problematic, given the unique institutional and cultural
obstacles to reporting sexual misconduct in the military―including the
imperative of unit cohesion, the expected self-sacrifice of the “leave no man
behind” credo, and the chain of command cage 307―raising the stakes for
sexual harassment will likely backfire, resulting in even fewer victims
reporting harassment within the military’s existing disciplinary system.
In sum, there is no doubt that adding a dedicated punitive article for
sexual harassment to the UCMJ would clarify for all branches what conduct
constitutes a criminal sexual harassment offense. This could benefit both
victims and alleged perpetrators, creating a uniform, transparent standard for
guiding behavior and reducing the potential for both under- and overregulation. A penal article on sexual harassment would also have
expressional value, signaling to all that sexual harassment is impermissible
conduct. However, there are significant downsides to this proposal if
implemented in isolation. Not only may it backfire by raising the stakes for
the involved service members, thereby deterring reporting, but criminalizing
sexual harassment is an inappropriate response to conduct that in any other
setting would be treated as a civil wrong. To be successful, a UCMJ criminal
article on sexual harassment must be paired with other reforms to the UCMJ
that will bring the military justice system into closer alignment with Title VII,
which we discuss in Part III.
III. ALIGNING THE UCMJ WITH TITLE VII
This Part turns to solutions. Here, we outline an updated regulatory
framework for the UCMJ that would bring the military’s legal response to
sexual harassment in alignment with civil employment discrimination law.
The first proposal is procedural. It seeks to ensure that sexual harassment
victims in the military have the same right to an independent investigation
and adjudication of their complaints as civilian employees. The second
proposal seeks to ensure that the evidentiary standard used to evaluate sexual
harassment complaints under the UCMJ is the preponderance of the evidence
standard; this can be achieved by relying on existing UCMJ administrative
actions. The third proposal seeks to ensure the service members can obtain
compensatory damages for economic and psychological injuries caused by
sexual harassment. We note that none of these reforms necessitates extending
Title VII to service members.

307

See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
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A. Process: The Right to an Independent Adjudication
When the military receives a report that a service member engaged in
sexually harassing conduct so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or
offensive work environment,308 responsibility for investigating and punishing
the conduct should be taken out of the chain of command. That is, military
victims of sexual harassment should receive the same protections as civilian
victims to an independent investigation, a written record, and independent
finder of fact and decisionmaker, as well as standardized procedures,
definitions, and recommended penalties for perpetrators.
We note here that our proposal represents an expanded version of the
Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA), first introduced by Senator Kirsten
Gillibrand in 2013.309 The MJIA would take charging discretion away from
unit commanders for sexual assaults and some other felony offenses and put it
in the hands of outside military attorneys.310 The stated objective of the MJIA
is to “professionalize how the military prosecutes serious crimes by moving
the decision over whether to prosecute them to independent, trained,
professional military prosecutors.”311 Senator Gillibrand, along with bipartisan
cosponsors, announced that the MJIA would be introduced as an amendment
to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.312
The MJIA is a step in the right direction, and we support its core
reform directing independent prosecution of sexual assault. However, it
should be expanded to include sexual harassment under certain
308

Or other conduct that would meet the definition of sexual harassment as defined in a new
UCMJ article on sexual harassment, including, presumably quid pro quo sexual harassment.
309
The MJIA has been consistently reintroduced into Congress since 2013. S. 967, 113th
Cong. (2013); S. 2992, 113th Cong. (2014); S. Amend. 1578, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 2141,
115th Cong. (2017); S. 1789, 116th Cong. (2019).
310
Rustico, supra note 183, at 2061. While the MJIA and its core reform was not signed into
law, it generated a great deal of discussion and has influenced several substantial reforms to
the UCMJ’s treatment of sexual assault. One such change is that, now, any “matters that
relate to the character of a victim” are barred from consideration when making disposition
decisions. See id. at 2040–46, 2061. Nor is the good military character of the accused given
consideration in sexual assault cases, removing the so-called “good soldier defense.” Id. at
2043. Retaliation against service members reporting a criminal offense is also strictly
prohibited. Id. at 2061 (citing National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub.
L. No. 113-66, § 1709, 127 Stat. 672, 960–61 (2013)).
311
Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Gillibrand, Cruz Offer Bipartisan Military
Justice Improvement Act Amendment to Defense Bill (July 2, 2020), https://www.grassley.
senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-gillibrand-cruz-offer-bipartisan-military-justice-im
provement-act [https://perma.cc/75QD-KSC8].
312
Id.; see also Press Release, Sen. Ted Cruz, Sens. Cruz, Gillibrand Reintroduce Military Justice
Improvement Act (June 13, 2019), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4527
[https://perma.cc/9HTL-W5VR] (noting that Republican co-sponsors included Senators Ted
Cruz, Chuck Grassley, Lisa Murkowski, and Rand Paul).
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circumstances, which we describe below. That is, the MJIA does not go far
enough, for it leaves discipline for sexual harassment within the chain of
command when all evidence suggests that sexual harassment is as persistent a
problem in the military as sexual assault313 and when even the military’s own
studies find a strong correlation between sexual harassment and assault.314
Removing investigatory, charging, and disciplinary discretion for
both sexual assault and harassment outside of the chain of command would
be a significant change to the UCMJ, because unit commanders have
something akin to prosecutorial discretion within their units.315 Limiting a
commander’s discretion to discipline certain offenses is antithetical to
military thinking, and the Department of Defense has remained opposed to
the MJIA.316 Opponents have argued against such a change, believing it
would degrade commanders’ ability to maintain order and discipline. 317 The
MJIA, in contrast, is concerned with obtaining just outcomes for sexual
assault victims by reducing the risk of biased decision-making by interested
unit commanders and encouraging victims to report complaints without fear
of retaliation.318
Our proposal―which would remove a commander’s discretion to
handle sexually harassing conduct so frequent or severe that it creates a
hostile or offensive work environment―represents an intermediate-level
intervention that fairly balances the military’s interests in preserving the
chain of command with justice for service members who suffer the harms of
sexual misconduct.319 In suggesting that the UCMJ be modified in this way,
313

See discussion supra Section II.A.
See DOD FY 2018 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, MAIN REPORT, supra note 6, at 11
(“[U]nhealthy climates marked by sexual harassment, gender discrimination, workplace
hostility, lack of unit cohesion, and lack of personal responsibility incrementally increase the
risk of experiencing a sexual assault.”); SAAITF Report, supra note 140, at 18 (“Based on
surveys conducted by the Department, there is a strong positive correlation between the
occurrence of sexual harassment within military units and the occurrence of sexual assault.
Commands and installations with greater occurrence of sexual harassment often have higher
rates of sexual assault.”).
315
See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
316
ROLE OF THE COMMANDER SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 192, at 2 (primarily
arguing that there was no strong evidence to suggest that removing charging discretion would
be effective in addressing sexual assault).
317
Id. at 102 (citing statements of a high-ranking Airforce General who believed that giving
commanders “responsibility without authority” would degrade the trust that they must be fair
and impartial, ultimately weakening the system and reducing military effectiveness).
318
Such fears are well founded. See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
319
Of note, in 2020, Representatives Jackie Spier and Markwayne Mullin introduced a bill
in the House of Representatives containing a similar proposal. See I am Vanessa Guillén Act
of 2020, H.R. 8270, 116th Cong. (2020). The Act would require each military department to
establish an Office of the Chief Prosecutor and transfer charging decisions for sex-related
314
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we acknowledge that isolated incidents of sexual harassment may escape
redress. Where the conduct does not rise to the level of severe sexual
misconduct, offenders may have “one bite of the apple,” so to speak, without
the incident being removed from the chain of command. However difficult
the choice to reform the UCMJ in this way, we suggest that the military’s
legitimate interests in preserving the chain of command should permit a
commander to address isolated complaints of sexual harassment “in-house.”
This authority should be removed as soon as one or more reports suggest that
a service member has engaged in serial acts of sexual harassment or severe
sexual misconduct. This approach would align the UCMJ with civil sexual
harassment law, which defines hostile work environment sexual harassment
as unwelcome conduct, because of sex, that is severe or pervasive enough to
create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider
intimidating, hostile, or abusive. 320
This proposal is not a far stretch from existing military law. There are
already some mechanisms in place enabling the centralized human resources
component of a military branch to initiate involuntary administrative
separations of service members outside of a unit commander’s discretion.321
Such separations can be initiated based on a service member’s official records
of misconduct, sometimes referred to as “bad paper.” 322 The DOD is already
cataloging incidents of sexual assault and harassment in the CATCH
program. Therefore, it is not a giant leap to empower independent military

offenses, including sexual harassment and sexual assault, from the commander to the
service’s chief prosecutor. Id.; see also Alex Horton, Proposed Vanessa Guillén Law Would
Transform Military’s Sexual Misconduct Inquiries, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2020, 3:04 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/09/16/proposed-vanessa-guillnlaw-would-transform-militarys-sexual-misconduct-inquiries/ [https://perma.cc/LLK3-S445]
(reporting that Vanessa Guillén was murdered the day before she was planning to file a
harassment complaint against her harasser).
320
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986); Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
harassment [https://perma.cc/S2DY-6ASC] (last visited Dec. 18, 2020).
321
See Administrative Separation / Boards of Inquiry, LAW OFFICE OF JOCELYN C. STEWARD,
https://www.ucmj-defender.com/practice-areas/administrative-separation-boards/ [https://perma.
cc/3WGA-VEVG] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). This primer discusses Army Human Resources
Command (HRC) initiating administrative separation boards for enlisted service members
and Boards of Inquiry for officers to decide whether a service member should be permitted
to stay in service based on nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 or letters of reprimand
(GOMORS). Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 135-175 §§ 2-13 at 14–15, 2-17 at 16,
2-19 at 16–17 (Mar. 30, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, NAVY MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL
(MILPERSMAN) 1910-010, 1910-100, 1920-010, https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/
reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZW734L2Z] (last visited Nov. 5th, 2020) (discussing Navy human resources enlisted and officer
involuntary separation).
322
Id.
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investigators, prosecutors, or centralized human resources offices to use this
information to investigate and discipline sexual harassment.323
Our proposal to reform the UCMJ and CATCH program to better
align with civil employment discrimination law raises a question: Why does
Title VII not apply to the military in the first place? Indeed, other experts
on discrimination in the military have proposed extending Title VII to cover
all military personnel. 324 While the military is a workplace as much as any
other, it is also a unique institution justifying an independent legal system.
Practical considerations also make extending Title VII to the military

323

Another question, which we will leave for another day, is whether a disciplinary response
for severe or pervasive sexual harassment should be mandatory or whether a confidential
reporting process for sexual harassment should be integrated into the military’s existing
CATCH program. This is a difficult question and there are persuasive arguments on both sides.
As discussed, supra, the CATCH system permits the military to sit on information
demonstrating serious crimes, repeat offenses, and systemic sex discrimination if a victim
does not file an unrestricted report. This system irrationally relieves the military of
responsibility for serious or repeat sexual misconduct even if it knows of the conduct. This
may be justifiable in the criminal context in light of notions of prosecutorial discretion.
However, in the civilian employment context, the idea that an employer could systematically
collect information about sexual harassment without taking any responsive action and avoid
Title VII liability is inconceivable by any civil standard.
On the other hand, as we discuss, supra, the option of anonymous reporting for
sexual harassment (as with sexual assault) could contribute to increased reporting, given that
retaliation for reporting sexual misconduct is rampant in the military. See sources cited supra
notes 147–149 and accompanying text. Creating a confidential reporting process for sexual
harassment that is integrated with the existing CATCH program would also obviate the need
for victims to assess whether the sexual misconduct they experienced fits neatly into
particular categories, and it might normalize a culture of reporting sexual misconduct in the
military. Finally, because military surveys find a strong correlation between sexual
harassment and assault in the military, see discussion supra note 314, extending CATCH to
sexual harassment would strengthen the military’s ability to address sexual assault by helping
to identifying service members who often engage in both types of sexual misconduct.
These competing arguments track feminist debates about how best to address sexual
violence in the civilian context. There are no easy answers. Given the benefits of CATCH in
the current military climate, it may be too soon to recommend that sexual harassment victims
be forced to report publicly. However, as an aspirational matter, that is the direction we hope
the current reforms are heading. It is our hope that, as a first step, by taking investigations
and disciplinary responses for sexual harassment out of the chain of command (along with
sexual assault), at least where a victim voluntarily wishes to make an unrestricted report, a
significant change in culture will result. Victims would feel comfortable reporting sexual
misconduct without fear of retaliation by commanders and peers. In turn, the military would
be obligated to take responsive action when those reports come to light. While it is likely
premature, we think this would ultimately be best.
324
See Michael I. Spak & Alice M. McCart, Effect of Military Culture on Responding to
Sexual Harassment: The Warrior Mystique, 83 NEB. L. REV. 79, 99 (2004) (citing Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)); see also Hollywood, supra note 184, at 194–95;
Westergard, supra note 40, at 232.
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unlikely.325 Reforming the UCMJ in the manner suggested here, on the other
hand, would respect the unique nature and interests of the military, because
military investigators and prosecutors would have jurisdiction over sexual
harassment cases rather than civilian courts. This approach would bring the
civilian and military justice systems closer together, modernizing the UCMJ
while respecting the military’s jurisdictional independence.
B. Evidence: Using Administrative Actions and a Civil Burden of Proof
Congress and the military are aware that there is a problem with
sexual harassment in the Armed Forces, but the prohibition against suits for
torts or Title VII workplace discrimination 326 means that criminal courtsmartial have become the preferred method to demonstrate that the military is
taking sexual misconduct seriously. 327 This is reflected in the military’s
treatment of sexual assault, where there has been a push to pursue courtsmartial rather than administrative remedies.328
The UCMJ is a criminal code by definition, so it is understandable
that the military has chosen to view sexual harassment through the lens of
criminal law rather than focus on its discriminatory harms.329 However, as a
civil legal concept, sexual harassment is broader than sexual assault; it
includes attempting to make work conditions contingent on sexual favors,
unwanted sexual attention, and harassing conduct that disparages a person
because of sex.330 Punishing sexual harassment as a crime would no doubt
325

As previously noted, there is a long line of Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions holding
that Title VII does not apply to uniformed personnel. See cases cited supra note 174. Given
that the Supreme Court does not seem poised to reverse this precedent, it would likely require
an act of Congress to bring uniformed service members under Title VII’s protection. It is
difficult to envision Congress enacting such a significant change to the Armed Forces in our
present hyper-partisan political climate.
326
See supra Section II.B.2.
327
See Chema, supra note 224, at 6–7 (stating that service members’ lack of remedy for
sexual harassment under Title VII, as well as the Feres doctrine’s prohibition on commonlaw torts, increases emphasis on criminalization of sexual harassment).
328
See generally Engel, supra note 303, at 135 (arguing that 1) public and media anger about
the military’s light treatment of sexual assault through administrative remedies has led to a
push to criminally prosecute sexual assault, which results in more acquittals due to the higher
burden of proof and difficulty meeting that burden with the typical evidence, and that 2)
focusing only on the criminal aspect of sexual assault fails to address the discriminatory
harms caused by sexual assault, and thus does not effectively deter sexual assault).
329
Id.
330
See Sarah L. Cook, Lilla M. Cortina & Mary P. Koss, What’s the Difference Between
Sexual Abuse, Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment and Rape?, THE CONVERSATION (Sept.
20, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://theconversation.com/whats-the-difference-between-sexualabuse-sexual-assault-sexual-harassment-and-rape-88218 [https://perma.cc/D6B3-VG9V];
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convey a level of seriousness, but it would be a blunt, inaccurate tool in
addressing discrimination.331 Moreover, criminalization is indicative of the
military continuing to view sexual misconduct as a problem of finite bad
actors rather than as a systemic, institutional problem facilitated by the
military’s culture and organizational composition.
To be sure, the military holds service members to a higher standard
of conduct than civilians. Thus, the UCMJ criminalizes some conduct that
would not otherwise be a crime in the civilian sphere.332 However, military
prosecutors would likely find it difficult to prove cases beyond a reasonable
doubt in a court-martial when sexual harassment cases are often based solely
on the testimony of the victim and accused.333
We acknowledge that using administrative action to address sexual
misconduct has been criticized as light treatment—a slap on the wrist, so to
speak.334 This is certainly true in some cases, where unit commanders use less
severe administrative actions like oral or written counseling to address
substantiated cases of sexual assault. 335 However, there is a spectrum of
administrative actions, including more serious forms such as a General
Officer Order of Reprimand (GOMOR).336 It is these more serious UCMJ
administrative actions that we suggest using to address sexual harassment.
Importantly, as an administrative action, GOMORs use a non-criminal
evidentiary standard (the preponderance of the evidence) that is more
see also supra note 320 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs have attempted to address sexual
harassment through tort law, for instance, by bringing claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED), but IIED encompasses actions outside of conduct constituting
sexual harassment. See Joanna Stromberg, Comment, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination
or Tort?, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 317, 337–39 (2003).
331
See Westergard, supra note 40, at 230–31 (“Because the UCMJ was designed to
approximate the criminal law rather than employment law, it is ill-equipped to resolve
disputes over adverse employment actions.”).
332
See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1150 n.2 (noting that adultery, for example, is punishable
as a criminal offense under UCMJ Article 134).
333
This assertion is based on the fact that we see a similar issue with sexual assault
allegations. There is often insufficient evidence to prosecute assault cases because military
prosecutors are evaluating evidence for a court-martial under a criminal burden of proof. See
e.g., DOD FY 2019 REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, APP. B, supra note 146, at 17 tbl.4, 27
fig.15 (reporting that, of the 3,716 sexual assault case dispositions considered for possible
action by DOD commanders in the fiscal year 2019, only 50 or 1% were determined to be
unfounded after legal review, yet 710 or 19% of the cases only provided probable cause to
prosecute a non-sexual assault offense, and 1,022 or 28% had insufficient evidence to
prosecute any offense).
334
For example, The Invisible War (Chain Camera Pictures 2012), a documentary film
chronicling the issue of sexual assault in the military, focused on light treatment of
perpetrators with administrative actions such as informal or written counseling.
335
To be clear, we do not support administrative action for substantiated instances of rape or
sexual assault.
336
See ARMY REG. 600-37, supra note 199, para. 3-4, at 4–5.
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appropriate for sexual harassment offenses than a criminal burden of proof. 337
A GOMOR is where a General Officer (an officer with the rank of General)
issues a reprimand or directs a reprimand issued by a subordinate to be filed
permanently in a service member’s Official Military Personnel File
(OMPF).338 While a “reprimand” might sound innocuous to those outside the
military, GOMORs are widely understood and accepted to be a “kiss-ofdeath” for a service member’s career, especially if they are made a permanent
part of a service member’s personnel file. 339 Receiving this sort of reprimand
will, at the very least, stop the career progression of a service member because
of the stain left on their record.340 A GOMOR can also trigger an
administrative separation. 341 A discharge based on a GOMOR can be
337

The Air Force requires a preponderance of evidence to evaluate conduct supporting a
punitive letter of reprimand. See U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 36-2907, UNFAVORABLE
INFORMATION FILE (UIF) PROGRAM para. 4.1.3. (Nov. 26, 2014). The Navy and Marine
Corps limit use of punitive letters of reprimand to punishment imposed by court-martial or
nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, but a preponderance of evidence standard is used
for Article 15 actions in the Navy. See U.S. Dep’t of Navy, Navy Admin. Message No.
189/14, Inclusion and Command Review of Information on Sex-related Offenses in
Personnel Service Records para. 7 (Aug 14, 2014), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/reference/messages/Documents2/NAV2014/NAV14189.txt [https://perma.cc/W7W7UYNN] (noting that, in the Navy, a punitive letter of reprimand cannot be filed in a service
member’s personnel file pursuant to a non-punitive administrative action); MANUAL OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (JAGMAN) § 0110 (2012) (stating that, in the Navy, a
preponderance of the evidence standard is used for nonjudicial punishment under Article 15).
The Army uses a preponderance standard for administrative investigations, which would be
the fact-finding context for sexual harassment allegations forming the basis of a punitive
letter of reprimand. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS para. 3-10.b., at 24 (Apr. 1, 2016).
338
See sources supra notes 195–207 and accompanying text; see also 7TH ARMY TRAINING
COMMAND, U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, LEGAL ASSISTANCE INFORMATION PAPER: LETTERS OF
REPRIMAND AND GENERAL OFFICER MEMORANDUMS OF REPRIMAND [hereinafter ARMY
INFORMATION PAPER ON GOMARS], https://www.7atc.army.mil/Portals/17/Documents/SJA/
GOMORandLORwithTemplate.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX7J-M4EC] (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
339
See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170 n.98 (providing numerous examples of GOMORs
having serious negative consequences on career progression in the military).
340
See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170; ARMY INFORMATION PAPER ON GOMARS, supra
note 338, at 2 (“Receiving a GOMOR may prevent you from being promoted.”).
341
See, e.g., Caez v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding
involuntary separation of an Army Guard reserve officer after he received a GOMOR for
adultery, conduct unbecoming of an officer, and drug use); ARMY INFORMATION PAPER ON
GOMARS, supra note 338, at 2 (stating that receiving a GOMOR may trigger a review
leading to denial of continued service). Given the interests at stake, service members facing
administrative separations have due process rights, including the right to notice, present
evidence, cross examine witnesses, and appeal; however, commentators have argued that in
practice the process afforded is minimal. See Major Brian D. Andes, The End Does Not
Justify the Means: Why Diminished Due Process During Reductions in Force is Unjust, 225
MIL. L. REV. 84, 101–03 (2017) (discussing procedures and due process rights for officers
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classified as “other than honorable,” a red flag for civilian employers. 342 As
it currently stands, while independent human resources components may
initiate proceedings to remove a service member on the basis of a
GOMOR,343 the unit commander of the offending service member remains
the person with discretion under the UCMJ to take the initial administrative
action.344 Congress could amend the UCMJ to change this for sexual
harassment, giving discretion and authority to initiate administrative action
to centralized human resources components of the branches or a review board
specifically designed to address sexual misconduct. The goal and effect
would be to create a non-criminal mechanism to address sexual harassment
outside of the chain of command.
Aggressive use of GOMORs has shown to be effective at stimulating
cultural shifts in the military, as exemplified by the case of driving under the
influence (DUI).345 Starting in the 1980s, the military sought to address high
rates of alcohol related offenses like DUI by issuing regulations directing that
GOMORs be given to service members who had been found driving with
blood alcohol content over the legal limit. 346 Given the serious ramifications
of GOMORs, the DOD and branch secretaries elevated DUI to a careerending offense in many cases. 347 Today, due to these policy and enforcement
facing administrative separations); Bojan, supra note 198, at 1152 (“Arguably, GOMORs . . .
have become de facto punishment not subject to the extensive due process protections of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).”).
342
See Meghna Chakrabarti, Life After an Other-Than-Honorable Discharge, NPR (Dec. 12,
2013, 1:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/250543667 [https://perma.cc/Y93A-HPSH]
(detailing a conversation with former service members about how an Other than Honorable
Discharge negatively affected their civilian lives); see also VETERANS HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., OTHER THAN HONORABLE DISCHARGES:
IMPACT ON ELIGIBILITY FOR VA HEALTH CARE BENEFITS, IB 10-448 (2017), https://
www.va.gov/healthbenefits/resources/publications/IB10-448_other_than_honorable_discharges
5_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ57-JPQ6] (describing how an Other than Honorable Discharge
characterization can negatively affect VA benefits).
343
See sources cited supra note 321.
344
See MCM, supra note 184, at II-28 (R.C.M. 306(c)(2)).
345
Stephen Gerras & Col. Charles Allen, Strategic Leadership and Organizational Culture,
in STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: THE GENERAL’S ART 177, 189 (Mark Grandstaff & Georgia
Sorensen eds., 2008).
346
See id. at 190 (recalling that officers would get GOMORs if they were caught driving
drunk, “significantly reduc[ing] their chances of subsequent promotion); see also U.S. DEP’T
OF ARMY, REG. 190-5, MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC SUPERVISION para. 2-7, at 7 (May 22, 2006)
(providing a joint regulation shared between all branches of the military, alternatively titled
OPNAV 1120.5D, AFI 31-218(I), MCO 5110.1D, and DLAR 5720.1).
347
See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1170, 1195 (stating that GOMORs, which are generally
perceived as career killers in the military, are automatically given to service members who
receive a DUI); see also USAG Stuttgart Law Center, How a DUI Forever Changed a Local
Soldier’s Career, ARMY.MIL (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/165772/how_a_
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reforms, DUI is arguably taken far more seriously in the military than in many
civilian workplaces.348 As a result of the use of GOMORs in this context, in
today’s military, it is simply understood that DUI will impact a military
career. As a consequence, there is far less cultural acceptance of driving under
the influence of alcohol.349
If DOD leadership were to issue directives instructing GOMORs to
be filed in cases where a preponderance of the evidence supported a finding
of sexual harassment, it could create the same sort of cultural shift that was
achieved with DUI. While some have expressed concern about due process
when using GOMORs, given their serious career ramifications,350 the simple
fact is that criminal burdens of proof are not well-suited to address sexual
harassment allegations. Moreover, the use of this punitive administrative
action would only result after an investigation into the alleged sexual
harassment, with the alleged perpetrator having an opportunity to respond
before a GOMOR is filed in their record.351 Additionally, even though they
are classified as administrative actions, GOMORs have a stigma attached to
them that is difficult to convey to those outside the military; they are
considered far more serious than nonjudicial punishment under Article 15. 352
dui_forever_changed_a_local_soldiers_career [https://perma.cc/4FMJ-LCWU] (discussing
the long-term negative consequences on a soldier’s career after having received a DUI and a
general officer letter of reprimand).
348
This assertion is primarily based on co-author Sagen Gearhart’s experience as an Officer in
the U.S. Army. While a DUI might have may or may not have some impact on an individual’s
civilian job, it absolutely will affect a military career.
349
See Gerras & Allen, supra note 345, at 190 (noting that allocation of rewards and status
is a powerful motivator of culture change in the military, and that “[t]he power of a
mechanism that effects evaluations and promotions cannot be overstated.”). Even though
“negative impact on promotion” is technically less severe than court-martial or nonjudicial
punishment, it may seem more immediate and pressing to the average servicemember, who might
see UCMJ punishment as remote or unlikely, and therefore be a better motivator of conduct.
350
See Bojan, supra note 198, at 1153 (expressing concern about a perceived lack of due
process for punitive reprimands in the Army).
351
Department of Defense Equal Opportunity policy mandates a unit level investigation for
unrestricted reports of sexual harassment. See DODI 1020.03, supra note 285, § 4.4(a)–(b),
at 14 (Feb. 8, 2018) (instructing that within 72 hours of receiving a complaint of sexual
harassment, the service members commanding officer will forward the complaint to their
next superior officer who is authorized to convene a general court-martial and begin an
investigation of the complaint); see also ARMY REG. 600-37, supra note 199, para. 3-4(d), at
4 (specifying that notice and opportunity to respond must be given to recipients of GOMORs
before a filing determination is made).
352
This is based somewhat on the co-author Sagen Gearhart’s experience in the military, but
nonjudicial punishment is commonly understood to be a limited punishment, whereas
GOMOR’s are commonly understood to be very serious. See MCM, supra note 184, at V-2
(outlining nonjudicial punishment process under the Uniform Code of Military Justice); see
also Bojan, supra note 198, at 1175 (stating that filing a GOMOR in a soldier’s personnel
file “has the same effect as a general officer saying, ‘[y]our career is over.’”).
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As seen with DUI, stigma attaches to offenses where service members expect
that GOMORs will be used.
C. Remedies: Compensating Victims, Reining in Feres
Civilian employees who are sexually harassed can sue their
employers for employment discrimination, for which compensatory and
punitive damages, up to statutorily set limits, are available under Title VII.353
This includes federal employees. 354 Although not common,355 employees
who are sexually harassed can also file tort claims against their employers or
perpetrators.356 Remedies for sexual harassment (and assault) within the
military justice system, in contrast, focus on disciplining the perpetrator. The
UCMJ does not provide compensation for the victim or incentivize systemic
accountability. As discussed previously,357 this regulatory framework
excluding military personnel from the protections of civil rights and tort law
is the result of federal courts’ interpretation of Title VII358 and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Feres v. United States,359 which federal courts have

353

See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3). Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to allow sex harassment
victims to sue for compensatory and punitive damages. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Punitive damages are not
available against the government, however. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
354
West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217 (1999) (holding that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the legal authority under § 2000e-16(b) of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they
discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII).
355
See Merle H. Weiner, Civil Recourse Insurance: Increasing Access to the Tort System for
Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 957, 974–84 (2020) (discussing
difficulties survivors face pursing tort claims against perpetrators, mainly because lawyers will
not take their cases); cf. Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #MeToo Moment?, 11 J.
TORT L. 39, 45 (2018) (noting that tort claims against sexual assault perpetrators are rare).
356
Joanna Stromberg, Comment, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination or Tort?, 12 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 317, 318 (2003) (advocating the use of assault and battery claims to challenge
workplace sexual harassment).
357
See supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.
358
The federal circuit courts to have considered the question have unanimously held that
Title VII does not cover military service members, ostensibly based on concerns over military
discipline and Congress’s inaction in reversing the judicially-created exemption, see sources
cited supra note 174, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied review of the issue,
including as recently as 2020. See Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert.
denied sub nom. Jackson v. Braithwaite, No. 20-19, 2020 WL 6829074 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2020);
Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 959 (1988); Johnson
v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S 986 (1978).
359
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
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expanded over time to prohibit virtually all civil suits against the government
by service members.360
The primary justifications for the Feres doctrine―that sexual
misconduct claims will disrupt military discipline and that those who
experience sexual harassment can be compensated with military
benefits 361―are especially unconvincing when applied to victims of sexual
harassment. Military benefits are not designed to address the psychological
and economic harms of sexual harassment, which are significant. 362 Research
finds extensive psychological effects, including depression, anxiety, panic
disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder.363 One national study of 3,006
360

In Feres, the Supreme Court held that uniformed members of the armed services may not
bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course
of activity incident to service.” Id. Since then, the courts have expanded the doctrine to apply
broadly to bar suits against the government for injuries sustained in many circumstances far
removed from their military duties, including injuries sustained as a result of discrimination
otherwise prohibited by Title VII and the Constitution. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296, 304–05 (1983) (barring constitutional claims for race discrimination); Martinez v.
McCarthy, No. 20-1746-cv, 2020 WL 7579516, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2020) (barring Title VII
sex and race-based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims); Johnson v. Alexander, 572
F.2d 1219, 1223–24 (8th Cir. 1978) (barring Title VII race discrimination claim).
361
Generally, compensation to injured service members is provided pursuant to the Veterans
Benefits Act (BVA). See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 101–4335.
362
See Gregory C. Sisk, The Peculiar Obstacles to Justice Facing Federal Employees Who
Survive Sexual Violence, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 281 (“As with workers’ compensation
generally, the VBA is not designed to address th[e] unique violation to personal dignity”
caused by sexual violence).
363
See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING R EALITIES: USING SOCIAL
SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 187–89 (2005) (reviewing research
on psychological effects of sexual harassment); WILLIAM E. FOOTE & JANE GOODMANDELAHUNTY, EVALUATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS IN FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS 130–31 (2005) (reviewing research on PTSD
effects of sexual harassment); Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, Effects of Sexual
Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 166–69
(William O’Donohue ed., 1997) (finding in a national study of more than 3,000 randomly
sampled women that those who experienced sexual harassment were more likely to be
diagnosed with a range of psychological disorders, including depression, anxiety, and
PTSD); Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations:
Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 30
(1993) (citing studies on the psychological impacts of sexual harassment); Jason N. Houle,
Jeremy Staff, Jeylan T. Mortimer, Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, The Impact of
Sexual Harassment on Depressive Symptoms During the Early Occupational Career, 1
SOC’Y & MENTAL HEALTH 89, 101 (2011) (finding that harassment early in a person’s career
has long-term effects on depressive symptoms in adulthood); Kimberly T. Schneider,
Suzanne Swan & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Job-Related and Psychological Effects of Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 401, 412–13 (1997) (finding that sexual harassment, even at relatively low
frequencies, exerts a significant negative impact on psychological well-being; “harassment
apparently does not have to be particularly egregious to result in negative consequences.”).
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adults found that 21.9% of those surveyed who had experienced harassment
that met the EEOC definition of sexual harassment were currently
experiencing major depressive disorder.364 Although less well studied,
research finds physical symptoms as well, including “stomach and appetite
problems, sleep disorders, headaches, and crying spells, just to name
some.”365 Economic and job effects of sexual harassment are also significant.
According to one DOD survey, more than half of female and more than onethird of male service members who experienced unwanted sexual contact or
harassment indicated that they thought about getting out of their service due
to the experience.366 Likewise, studies in the civilian context also find
significant economic effects of sexual harassment, including being demoted,
reassigned, or fired after reporting or quitting in response to harassment rather
than reporting.367
Even accepting the basic principle of Feres that “the Government is
not liable under the . . . Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
out of or are in the course of activity incident to service,”368 the idea that
“service” should include the harms of sexual misconduct is at odds with any
common or ordinary understanding of the term. Every current and former
service member in the military understands that wearing a uniform comes with
364

See Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 363, at 166.
BEINER, supra note 363, at 187; see also Dansky & Kilpatrick, supra note 363, at 168
(surveying studies finding health effects including headaches, gastroinstinal disturbance,
sleep disturbance, fatigue, nausea, and weight loss).
366
See 2012 WGRA SURVEY, supra note 129, at 67–68. An earlier study of the military by
independent researchers Magley and colleagues found similar results. Vicki J. Magley, Craig
R. Waldo, Fritz Drasgow & Louise F. Fitzgerald, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on
Military Personnel: Is It the Same for Men and Women?, 11 MIL. PSYCH. 283, 297 (1999)
(finding that military personnel who were sexually harassed were less satisfied with work,
colleagues, and supervisors; less committed to the military; and experienced reduced work
productivity).
367
Just to provide one very reliable example, the 2016 United States Merit System Protection
Board Study of more than 42,000 federal employees found that during the two-year period
from 2014 to 2016, as a consequence of sexual harassment, 17% of sexual harassment targets
reported using annual leave; 17% reported using sick leave; 13% reported being denied a
promotion, pay increase, good performance rating, or good reference; 6% transferred or quit;
and 22% reported a decline in productivity. OFFICE OF POLICY AND EVALUATION, U.S. MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, UPDATE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: RESEARCH BRIEF 9 (2018), https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.
aspx?docnumber=1500639&version=1506232&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/
SJ7L-TMRY]; U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, MERIT PRINCIPLES SURVEY 2016
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 3 (2016), https://www.mspb.gov/foia/Data/MSPB_MPS2016_
MethodologyMaterials.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4BB-YLSZ] (reporting response rate for the
2016 Merit Systems Protection Principles Survey of federal employees); see also BEINER,
supra note 363, at 10 (“One of the more reliable series of studies of working populations is
that of the USMSPB.”)
368
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
365
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risk, including giving one’s life, but it can hardly be said that sexual harassment
and sexual assault are expected risks of military service, unless one is referring
to the risk of rape by an enemy. Sexual harassment does not obviously advance
any military mission and in fact undermines the effectiveness of the military
given its negative impacts on job satisfaction and performance.369
The absence of an economic remedy also fundamentally undermines
the DOD’s efforts to increase reporting of sexual misconduct.370 Without any
meaningful remedy, service members have almost no incentive to report
discrimination, all the more so in light of the common experience of retaliation
for making a report.371 It is easy to see how the cost of reporting outweighs any
potential personal or organizational benefits. Moreover, by undermining
accountability, the Feres doctrine creates the ideal conditions for sexual
harassment and other kinds of sexual misconduct to flourish in the military.372
To modernize the military justice system, military victims of sexual
harassment (and other sexual misconduct, for that matter) should receive the
same protections as civilian victims, including the ability to obtain compensatory
damages. We note here that this proposal is not beyond the pale; there are
multiple avenues to reign in Feres. More than one Supreme Court Justice has
questioned Feres, including some of the Court’s more conservative members,373
and the Court will soon decide whether to hear a case asking it to revisit the

See NiCole T. Buchanan, Isis H. Settles, Angela T. Hall & Rachel C. O’Connor, A Review
of Organizational Strategies for Reducing Sexual Harassment: Insights from the U. S.
Military, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 687, 689 (2014) (“Sexual harassment affects the organization
because targeted employees report decreased performance and organizational commitment,
as well as increased withdrawal, turnover, and team conflict.”) (internal citation omitted).
370
See discussion supra Sections II.B.1 and II.C.1.
371
See sources cited supra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
372
See Dwight Stirling, The Feres Doctrine and Accountability, 1 J.L. POL’Y & MIL. AFF 1,
3 (2019) (finding that the Feres doctrine has wrought “institutionalized lawlessness” in the
military).
373
See Daniel v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1713, 1714 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“[D]enial of relief to military personnel and distortions of other areas of
law to compensate [] will continue to ripple through our jurisprudence as long as the Court
refuses to reconsider Feres.”); id. at 1713 (majority opinion) (“Justice Ginsburg would grant
the petition for a writ of certiorari [in a case asking the Court to overturn the Feres
doctrine].”); Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 932 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (reasoning that there is no support for Feres in the text of the Federal
Tort Claims Act and that Feres “has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen
of any remedy when they are injured by the negligence of the Government or its
employees.”); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700–01 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, J.J.) (“Feres was wrongly decided and heartily
deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal criticism’ it has received.”) (quoting In re “Agent
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
369
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doctrine.374 Moreover, in 2020, Congress took the first step by carving out a
limited exception to the doctrine, providing for a settlement process run
through the Department of Defense for certain tort suits against the military
involving medical malpractice.375 If the Court does not weigh in to fix the
injustice and overbreadth of Feres―which it unequivocally
should―Congress could expand this new program to include an avenue for
monetary compensation for service members who experience sexual assault
and harassment.376
n sum, the Feres doctrine does not serve the military’s mission, and
by deterring reporting, it undermines the military’s efforts to address sexual
harassment. As such, eliminating or at least narrowing this doctrine is crucial,
along with removing sexual harassment investigations from the chain of
command and utilizing administrative actions to punish sexually harassing
conduct. If these changes were implemented alongside a dedicated penal
article on sexual harassment, the UCMJ would more closely resemble civil
employment discrimination law.
CONCLUSION
Since World War II, the military has evolved significantly to reflect
the demographics of the entire country as well as its societal and cultural
norms. This progress was achieved through broader recognition and
protection of service members’ individual rights, including their due process
374

See Doe v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 2016, 2016 (2020) (granting motion to file petition
for writ of certiorari). The case before the Court involves a young woman who was raped by
a fellow cadet while on a walk one evening at West Point. According to briefs filed in the
case, authorities at West Point failed to adequately respond to the reported rape and in fact
encouraged the environment of sexual harassment that led to the student’s rape. Receiving
no assistance with her ordeal, she withdrew from the academy and filed suit for damages
against the U.S. government. See Brief of Federal Courts and Constitutional Law Professors
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 1, 22, Doe v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 2016
(2020) (No. 20-559).
375
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 731,
133 Stat. 1198, 1457–60 (2019) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2733a).
376
Or Congress could take more sweeping action and give service members the same civil
rights protections and access to civilian courts as civilian employees. With President Biden’s
election and democratic gains in the Senate, Senator Kristin Gillibrand announced that she
is presently working with civil rights groups to draft such legislation. See Phil Stewart,
Exclusive: Senator Gillibrand Eyes Extending Civil Rights Act Protections to U.S. Troops,
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rights377 and the rights of racial minorities, women, sexual minorities, and,
most recently, transgender individuals, to be free of discrimination and fully
integrated into the Armed Forces.378 Slowly, and with struggle, the military
has modernized. Yet this process is unfinished. It is time for the Department
of Defense to make good on its asserted commitment to sex and gender
equality, propounded in its hundreds of reports, studies, investigations, and
directives issued in the past thirty years. Confronting the military’s decadesold problem with sexual assault and harassment is an urgent issue.
Under Article I of the Constitution, the DOD maintains a separate
justice system, largely insulated from the mandates of the civil and criminal
justice systems that regulate civilians in the United States. The military’s
separate legal order has too often reflected cultural and legal norms that are
insufficiently concerned with individual rights. Women and other vulnerable
groups are particularly at risk when separate legal systems such as the
military’s embrace overtly racist, patriarchal, and homophobic ideals. In the
case of sexual assault and harassment, the UCMJ and its legal processes lack
core protections for victims, including the right to an independent investigation
and adjudication of sexual assault and harassment complaints and the ability to
receive compensation for injuries caused by sexual misconduct.
The Secretary of Defense has the authority to prescribe policies and
regulations for DOD employees, including those regulations pertaining to
equal opportunity and nondiscrimination. 379 Congress has the authority to
establish qualifications for and conditions of service in the Armed Forces.380
Military courts, authorized by Article I of the U.S. Constitution, have
jurisdiction over cases involving military service members.381 Finally,
constitutional rights identified by the Supreme Court generally apply to
members of the military,382 with some limitations.383 Despite this extensive
authority, none of these government institutions has held the military
sufficiently accountable to the modern understandings or legal requirements
of sex and gender equality.
This gap between the civilian legal system and the military justice
system has implications for both the military and American society. Sexual
assault and harassment hinder recruitment, undermine service members’
377
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). Marcum involved a former Air Force sergeant
convicted for engaging in consensual sex with men under his supervision. Id. at 200.
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performance, and waste considerable administrative, legal, and intellectual
resources, undermining the military’s overall effectiveness and mission.
Ongoing tolerance of sex discrimination and sexual misconduct in the military
also has societal-wide effects, perpetuating inequality in American society.
The good news is that there is already a significant legal and
administrative infrastructure in place enabling the military to modernize the
military justice system to effectively deter, adjudicate, and punish sexual
assault and harassment. Title VII’s statutory language and Supreme Court
precedent interpreting Title VII are already reflected in DOD policies and
directives. The UCMJ already provides for administrative punishments that
utilize a civil burden of proof appropriate for sexual harassment claims.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to set aside precedent that precludes
compensating service members for torts and discrimination they may
experience, more than one justice has signaled that the doctrine is ripe for
reconsideration, and the DOD has started to make exceptions for certain
injuries not incident to service. The military justice system can be modernized
from the inside out. And indeed, it must if the military is to justify its
continued independence from the civilian legal system.
Taking a critical look at the military’s record on the matter of sexual
misconduct should not be construed as an assertion that the Armed Forces are
inherently objectionable, nor should we believe that critiques of the military
are inherently unpatriotic. Such binary stances have become increasingly
commonplace now that the average American has little affiliation with the
military. Rather, the military is a cross section of America, with all of its
strengths and weaknesses. It is this representative nature that makes the military
a worthwhile focus of critical discussion and why we should care about how the
military addresses sexual harassment and sexual assault.

